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Leslie Yalof Garfield
“You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by chains and liberate him, 
bring him up to the starting line of a race and then say, ‘You are free to compete with all the 
others,’ and still justly believe that you have been completely fair.  Thus it is not enough just 
to open the gates of opportunity.  All our citizens must have the ability to walk through 
those gates.”1
The United State Supreme Court’s recent review of affirmative action admissions 
policies in Grutter v. Bollinger2 and Gratz v. Bollinger3 confirms that Equal Protection Challenges 
to affirmative action programs aimed at improving diversity in the classroom are subject to a 
different strict scrutiny test than are challenges to programs aimed at achieving racial equality 
in the workplace.  Since the first challenge to an affirmative action program over 25 years 
ago, the Court has required that a race-conscious program not be upheld under the 
Constitution unless it passes the strict scrutiny test.4 Justice Powell first articulated the strict 
scrutiny test in University of California at Davis v. Bakke,5 writing that a race-conscious program 
survives strict scrutiny if it is “precisely tailored to serve a compelling interest.”6 Post-Bakke 
challenges more clearly defined the test, requiring state or federal entities defending any race-
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1 President Lyndon B. Johnson, in his June 4, 1965, Howard University speech, “To Fulfill These Rights,” 
reprinted in a letter to the editor, Joseph A. Califano Jr., Letter to the Editor, L.B.J. on Race Equality, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 29, 2003, at A22.  The writer was special assistant to President Johnson, 1965-69. 
2 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003). 
3 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003). 
4 See infra Part I. A. 
5 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
6 Id. at 299. 
1conscious program to demonstrate that there was a compelling governmental interest in the 
program, and to establish that the program was narrowly tailored to meet that interest.7
The Bakke case considered whether the affirmative action admissions program at the 
University of California at Davis (“UC Davis”) violated the Equal Protection Clause by 
granting preferential treatment in its admissions decisions to applicants of color.8 Justice 
Powell, writing for a plurality of the Court, identified a compelling governmental interest in 
achieving diversity in the classroom, but found – along with four of his brethren – that the 
UC Davis program was not narrowly tailored to meet that objective.9 Following Bakke, the 
Court heard a series of affirmative action challenges, all of which considered the 
constitutionality of affirmative action programs aimed at providing greater racial equality in 
the workplace.10 Through these cases, the Court identified a compelling governmental 
interest in remedying past effects of present discrimination, and more formally promulgated 
the narrowly tailored test to allow for ease of evaluation of these programs.11 
The post-Bakke challenges implicitly suggested the Court’s willingness to treat 
programs aimed at achieving diversity in the classroom differently from those designed to 
enhance equality in the workplace.  But the Court’s failure to put its imprimatur on Justice 
Powell’s decision had unfortunate results.  Because the Court never used the workplace 
challenges as an opportunity to endorse Justices Powell’s plurality decision in Bakke, a split 
developed in the circuits concerning whether Justice Powell’s definition of a compelling 
governmental interest in achieving diversity in the classroom was binding on lower courts.  
7 See infra Part II. 
8 Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
9 Id. at 307-10. 
10 See, e.g., Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); 
United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987); see Leslie Yalof Garfield, Squaring Affirmative Action Admissions 
Policies with Federal Judicial Guidelines: A Model for the Twenty-First Century, 22 J.C. & U.L. 895 (1996). 
11 See infra Part I. A. 2. 
2The Grutter and Gratz decisions, which presented the Court with the first post-Bakke 
challenge to affirmative action programs aimed at achieving diversity in the classroom, 
offered the Court an opportunity to endorse Justice Powell’s decision.  In reviewing 
challenges to two affirmative action admissions policies, the Court confirmed that there is a 
compelling governmental interest in achieving diversity in the classroom.12 Of equal import, 
while reviewing the challenged programs, the court articulated a “narrowly tailored” test that 
is, arguably, more appropriate for evaluating challenges to affirmative action programs aimed 
at achieving diversity in the classroom than those designed to increase racial equality in the 
workplace.13
This article will identify the new strict scrutiny test, and will consider the reason for 
creating a separate definition of strict scrutiny for evaluating affirmative action policies that 
achieve diversity in the classroom.  Part I of the article will review constitutional challenges 
to affirmative action policies prior to Grutter and Gratz, and will discuss the split in the 
circuits that resulted from the Court’s failure to endorse Justice Powell’s definition of a 
compelling governmental interest in Bakke. Part II will provide an analysis of the Grutter and 
Gratz decisions, with a particular focus on each Court’s discussion of the strict scrutiny test.  
Part III will define the Court’s strict scrutiny test for evaluating affirmative action admission 
policies, and will highlight why it is appropriate to use separate tests for challenges to 
affirmative action programs aimed at achieving diversity in the workplace and those aimed at 
achieving diversity in education.  
 
Part I: A Brief History of Challenges to Affirmative Action Programs and 
Policies 
 
12 See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2338; See Gratz, 123 S. Ct. 2411. 
13 See generally Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2337-40; see Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2426-28. 
3A. The Supreme Court’s Application of the Strict Scrutiny Test. 
 
1.  Challenges to affirmative action admissions policies. 
 
Because race-conscious affirmative action policies potentially granted preferential 
treatment to one class of people, opponents began challenging the policies, arguing that the 
policies violate the Equal Protection Clause.14 The Supreme Court first considered an 
affirmative action program in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.15 Allen Bakke, a 
white male, unsuccessfully applied for admission to the University of California at Davis 
14 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
15 438 U.S. 265 (1978).  
Equal Protection Challenges to post-secondary school admissions policies have shaped the form that 
such policies take.  Schools initially adopted race-conscious admissions policies in response to the civil rights 
movement and the practical realities of admitting minority students under the objective-based criteria upon 
which colleges and universities relied.  See Leslie Yalof Garfield & Kelly Levi,  Finding Success in the Cauldron of 
Competition: The Effectiveness of Academic Support Programs, __ BYU J. PUB. L. __ (2004).  As a practical and time-
saving matter, most admissions committees based acceptance to their institution on a student’s objective 
standardized test score and his or her grade point average.  See id. The large volume of applications to higher 
education institutions necessitated the need to create automatic admit and automatic rejection categories, which 
were defined in terms of a score that was based on an applicants score on standardized tests and/or an 
applicants grade point average from his or her prior academic institution.  See id. 
Unfortunately, as major studies conclude, under-represented minority groups do not perform as well 
on standardized tests as do members of the majority.  See id. Consequently, admissions to schools that heavily 
weighted standardized tests in their admissions process rarely admitted students of color.  In order to admit a 
diverse class, schools were faced with three options: (1) disregard the standardized tests entirely, (2) lower the 
floor for acceptable score on the standardized test, or (3) create what came to be called race-conscious 
admissions policies as a means to admit students who would not have been admitted under the strict objective 
standards.  See id. Under option three, race would be considered a “plus” that admissions committees would 
add to the student’s objective test scores.  See id. 
At the time, option one seemed entirely impractical.  Admissions committees had neither the time nor 
the resources to review every application that was submitted.  Moreover, the standardized test score, although 
criticized, provided, and still provides, a reasonable threshold for review of applications, therefore making the 
application review process slightly more manageable.  See id. Option two was quickly disregarded because, in 
the minds of academicians, lowering the floor of the acceptable test score would decrease the mean score of 
the class.  To those who subscribe that these test scores are objective, the scores reflect one’s academic ability 
and intellectual prowess; a lower mean would result in top schools diminishing the “eliteness” of their entering 
class. 
Thus, schools were left with option three and, beginning in the mid-1970s, schools began to devise 
their own race-conscious admissions programs as a means to admit more under-represented minority 
applicants.  See id. These programs followed Justice Powell’s edict in University of California v. Bakke, that post-
secondary school and graduate school admissions programs could consider race as a factor in its admissions 
process.  Consequently, schools began admitting students whose admissions files suggested that they were 
likely to become successful in their professional life, whose objective criteria, such as SAT, LSAT, or GMAT 
and grade point average, were not competitive with the majority of the entering class.  See id. These affirmative 
action admissions policies, also considered race-conscious admissions programs, provided another vehicle for 
enhancing minority representation in the classroom. See id.   
4(“Davis”) Medical School in 1973 and 1974.16 He challenged the school’s 1973 admission 
policy, adopted in an effort to diversify its entering class, on the grounds that it operated to 
exclude him from the school on the basis of his race.  Bakke challenged the policy as 
violating the Equal Protection Clause,17 the California Constitution,18 and Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VI”).19
At the time, Davis employed a bifurcated admissions policy.  One committee 
considered non-minority applicants who had achieved a minimum 2.5 undergraduate GPA 
(“UGPA”).20 Another committee considered all minority candidates, regardless of their 
objective scores.21 The school set aside a certain number of seats for applicants in each of 
16 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 266.  In 1973, Mr. Bakke received a benchmark score of 468/500, but his application was 
late, and after his application was completed, no applicants in the general admission pool were admitted with a 
score below 470/500.  Id. at 276.  At that time four seats in the special admission program were open, although 
Mr. Bakke was not considered for these seats.  Id. Mr. Bakke wrote to the Associate Dean and Chairman of the 
Admissions Committee, Dr. George H. Lowrey, to protest the admissions quotas.  Id. In 1974, Mr. Bakke 
applied early and received high marks from a student interviewer, but received low marks from the faculty 
interviewer who, coincidentally, was Dr. Lowrey.  Id. at 277.  Dr. Lowery gave him his lowest score of 86, 
making his total score 549/600 (there was one additional interviewer in 1974, so the total score was 600, as 
opposed to 500 in 1973).  Id. at 277.  Under the special admission program, applicants were admitted with 
significantly lower credentials than Mr. Bakke.  Id. at 277.   
17 U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1 reads: No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws. 
18 CAL. CONST. ART. I, § 7, reads: A citizen or class of citizens may not be granted privileges or immunities not 
granted on the same terms to all citizens. Privileges or immunities granted by the Legislature may be altered or 
revoked. 
19 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1989), reads: No person in the United States 
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits 
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. 
20 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 275.   
21 Id. at 274-75.  Each applicant in the non-minority group was evaluated on the basis of his or her UGPA, 
MCAT score, and observations made during a personal interview conducted by a member of the Admissions 
Committee.  The Committee automatically rejected non-minority applicants whose UGPA fell below 2.5.  Id. at 
265.  In contrast, the committee referred minority student applications to a Special Admissions Committee 
comprised mainly of members of minority groups.  This Committee rated minority applicants in a manner 
similar to the applicants in the general applicant pool, except that a 2.5 UGPA did not serve as a ground for 
summary rejection.  Id. at 275.  Thus, all minority applicants were considered for admission by the Special 
Admissions Committee, regardless of their UGPA.  Id.
With the exception of the minimum UGPA for non-minorities, students were evaluated for 
admissions based on the same general criteria.  However, each of the two Admissions Committees operated in 
a vacuum and did not compare its applicants to the other applicant group.  The Special Admissions Committee 
did not rate or compare minority applicants to the non-minority applicants but could accept or reject applicants 
based on failure to meet course requirements or other specific deficiencies.  The Special Admissions 
5the groups.22 Individuals from the general applicant pool could not fill seats from the 
minority applicant pool, even if seats were available.23 Bakke claimed that the policy, which 
allowed the school to set aside a certain number of places for minority applicants with lower 
objective test scores than his own, was tantamount to a quota.24 The trial court found that 
Davis’ admission policy was a racial quota and held that it violated the California and United 
States Constitutions, as well as Title VI.25 The California Supreme Court affirmed this.26
Upon the state’s appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari.27
The Supreme Court, considering both the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI, 
affirmed the California Supreme Court’s decision.28 The Court subjected the Davis program 
to the most exacting evaluation.  According to the Majority, “the Constitution guarantees 
that when a program touches upon an individual’s race or ethnic background, he is entitled 
to a judicial determination that the burden he is asked to bear... is precisely tailored to serve a 
Committee continued to recommend applicants until the number set by faculty vote were admitted.  Id. at 273-
75. 
22 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 275.  In 1968, when the overall class size was 50, the faculty set aside eight seats for 
minorities.  In 1971, the overall class size was expanded to 100, and in 1973, the number of seats set aside for 
minorities was expanded to sixteen.  Id.
23 Id. at 272-76. 
24 Id. at 277-78.  When Davis rejected Bakke in 1973, four seats reserved for applicants from the minority pool 
were unfilled, while the seats for the general admission pool were filled.  Id. at 266. Following the second 
rejection, Allen Bakke sued Davis and the Regents of the University of California in state court.  See generally 
Garfield, supra note 10. 
25 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 278-79.  In reaching its conclusion, the trial court emphasized that minority applicants in 
the program were rated only against one another and that 16 places out of the class of 100 were reserved 
exclusively for minorities.  Id. at 279. 
26 Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 553 P.2d 1152 (1976).  The California Supreme Court ordered UC 
Davis to admit Mr. Bakke to the Medical School, since the school was unable to demonstrate that the Plaintiff 
would not have been admitted in the absence of the challenged program.  Id. at 1172.  Applying strict scrutiny, 
it concluded that the program violated the Equal Protection Clause because it was not the least intrusive means 
of achieving the school’s compelling goals.  Id. at 1167.   
27 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 281. 
28 Bakke, 438 U.S. 265.  A Majority of the Supreme Court agreed that Davis must admit Bakke.  At the 
Supreme Court level, UC Davis maintained that there was no private right of action under Title VI.  Id. at 283-
84.  However, although the Court reached its decision based on the Equal Protection argument, it still 
recognized that a private right of action might exist under Title VI.  Id.  Because the issue was not argued or 
decided below, the Court chose not to address “this difficult issue.”  Id. at 283.  The Court also did not address 
the issue of whether private Plaintiffs under Title VI must exhaust administrative remedies prior to bringing 
legal action.  Id. at 283-84. 
6compelling governmental interest.”29 This language became the embodiment of the strict 
scrutiny test. 
The Court, in a highly fractionalized opinion, struck down the Davis policy.  Justice 
Powell was chosen to write the Majority opinion.  He concluded that the Davis program 
violated both Title VI and the Equal Protection Clause.  Applying the strict scrutiny test,30
Justice Powell found that there was a compelling governmental interest in attaining a diverse 
student body.31 A diverse student body contributing to a robust exchange of ideas is a 
constitutionally-permissible goal on which a race-conscious university admissions program 
may be predicated.32 However, although the Constitution does not bar admission policies 
from introducing race as a factor in the selection process, Justice Powell concluded that the 
program was not narrowly tailored, and that preferring members of any one group for no 
reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination on its own.33 The Davis admissions 
policy, which set aside a specific number of seats for students in identified minority groups, 
unfairly benefited the interest of a victimized group at the expense of other innocent 
29 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299 (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948)); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 
305 U.S. 337, 351 (1938).   
30 Id. at 299.  Justice Powell also wrote that “in order to justify the use of a suspect classification, a State must 
show that its purpose or interest is both constitutionally permissible and substantial, and that its use of the 
classification is ‘necessary ...  to the accomplishment’ of its purpose or the safeguarding of its interest.”  Id. at 
305 (quoting In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973)); see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); 
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 198 (1964).  
31 Attainment of a diverse student body is related to academic freedom.  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12. 
32 Id. Justice Powell noted that educational excellence is widely believed to be promoted by a diverse student 
body.  Id. at 313-14. 
33 Id. at 207.  (“We have never approved a classification that aids persons perceived as members of relatively 
victimized groups at the expense of other innocent individuals in the absence of judicial, legislative, or 
administrative findings of constitutional or statutory violations.”).  Id.   
Title VI clearly establishes that where there is a need to overcome the effects of past racially 
discriminatory or exclusionary practices engaged in by federally-funded institutions, race-conscious action is 
required to accomplish the remedial objectives of Title VI.  Id. at 307-09.  Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, 
and Blackmun agreed with this, stating that “[Title VI] does not bar the preferential treatment of racial 
minorities as a means of remedying past societal discrimination to the extent that such action is consistent with 
the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Id. at 328. 
7individuals and, therefore, violated the Equal Protection Clause.34 Additionally, its practice 
of having separate admissions subcommittees review minority and non-minority candidates 
inappropriately insulated applicants from comparison against the entire admissions pool.35
For these reasons, Justice Powell concluded that the Davis admissions policy was 
constitutionally impermissible. 
Justice Powell’s opinion acknowledged that the Majority viewed the Davis 
admissions policy as seeking to achieve a goal that is of paramount importance to the 
fulfillment of its mission and, in fact, as serving an important governmental interest.36
Justice Powell’s opinion endorsed the policy of considering race as a “plus” in instances 
where an affirmative action admissions policy is free from clear goals or quotas.37 Indeed, a 
majority of the Court recognized the University’s right to select students who would best 
contribute to the “robust exchange of ideas.”38 However, ethnic diversity is only one 
element in a range of factors a university may properly consider in attaining the goal of a 
heterogeneous student body.39 
34 Id. at 307.  Justice Powell upheld the California Supreme Court’s decision that the special admissions 
program was unlawful, and that Mr. Bakke was to be admitted to Medical School; however, it reversed the 
decision enjoining the Medical School from considering race in admissions.  Id. at 324-25.  Chief Justice Burger, 
and Justices Stewart, Rehnquist, and Stevens, in a concurring opinion, agreed that the policy was unlawful 
because it unfairly favored one group over another.  Id. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun 
concurred in the holding and dissented in part, as they did not believe that Allen Bakke should be admitted to 
the Medical School or that quotas should be maintained.  Id. at 379.  They joined in Parts I and V-C, and White 
joined in part III-A.  Id. at 328.  Along with Justice Powell, Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun 
upheld the use of race in the admissions process, while Justices Burger, Stevens, Rehnquist, and Stewart 
considered the issue irrelevant to this case.  See Ron Simmons, Affirmative Action: Conflict and Change in Higher 
Education After Bakke 1-2 (1982). 
35 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315. 
36 Id.
37 Id. at 317.  For example, assume two applicants, one minority and one non-minority, have the same UGPA 
and MCAT scores.  Under Justice Powell’s opinion, an admissions committee can offer admission to the 
minority applicant before it offers admission to the non-minority applicant, since a diversity viewpoint “plus” 
UGPA and MCAT score is of more value to the school than a non-diversity viewpoint and the same 
“objective” test scores. 
38 Id. at 312-13. 
39 Id. at 314.  The Court acknowledged that the importance of diversity may be greater at the undergraduate 
level than at the medical school level, where the focus is on “professional competency,” but concluded that the 
“contribution of diversity is substantial” even at this level, because doctors provide services to a 
8Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Stevens, Stewart, and Rehnquist, joined in Justice 
Powell’s conclusion that the program was invalid, based on the conclusion that the program 
violated Title VI, and thus there was no need to evaluate the program under the Equal 
Protection Clause.40 However, while not agreeing outright with Justice Powell’s compelling 
“governmental interest” definition, the plurality’s acknowledgement of a university’s right to 
achieve a heterogeneous student body suggests a tacit agreement.  Of the Justices’ lead 
opinion, Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun were in the minority, concluding 
that Title VI permits federally-funded entities to enact programs or policies that assist 
minority groups to gain equal access to programs more easily available to Caucasians.  
However, Title VI and the Civil Rights Act do not take precedence over the constitutional 
protection of the Equal Rights Clause, and thus such programs or policies are valid only to 
the extent that they are coterminous with the Fourteenth Amendment.  Thus, because four 
Justices chose to limit the extent of their agreement with Justice Powell’s conclusion, Justice 
Powell’s scrutiny of the Davis Policy under the Equal Protection Clause became, in a sense, 
a Majority of one.   
 
2.  Challenges to affirmative action programs aimed at achieving diversity 
in the workplace. 
 
The constitutionality of affirmative action admissions policies lay dormant for quite 
some time following the Bakke decision.  However, beginning in 1987, the Court reviewed a 
series of challenges to affirmative action policies in the workplace.  These cases, read 
“heterogeneous population.”  Id. at 313-14.  The Court also noted that while law schools focus on gaining legal 
skills and knowledge, this focus “cannot be effective in isolation from the individuals and institutions with 
which the law interacts.”  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314 (quoting Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950)). 
40 Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stevens, Stewart, and Rehnquist joined in his conclusion that the program 
was invalid, however, they did not consider the constitutional issue since they concluded that the program 
violated Title VI.  See generally id. at 408-22. 
9together, articulated clear guidelines for the application of the strict scrutiny test,41 and 
confirmed that courts must apply the test when reviewing challenges to state or federal 
affirmative action programs.42
In the first post-Bakke decision to consider the constitutionality of affirmative action 
admission policies, Justice Powell, again writing for the Plurality, took the opportunity to 
reaffirm the requirement that these programs pass the strict scrutiny test before a court may 
pronounce them as constitutional.  In Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Education,43 Justice Powell44
referred to his language in Bakke to enunciate the present strict scrutiny test.  The Wygant 
Court considered a collective bargaining agreement between the Board of Education and a 
teachers’ union that provided for layoffs by seniority, where the percentage of minorities laid 
off would exceed the percentage of minorities employed at the time.45 Justice Powell wrote 
that where race-based programs are concerned, the racial classification must be justified by 
“a compelling state purpose and the means chosen by the state to effectuate that purpose 
must be narrowly tailored.”46 
While Wygant reaffirmed the requirement of applying strict scrutiny to race-conscious 
policies, it did little to further define the test for future application.  The Court took the 
opportunity to more clearly define strict scrutiny the following year, when it decided United 
States v. Paradise.47 Paradise considered the constitutionality of a one-black-to-one-white 
41 See generally United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987). 
42 See Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding that courts must apply the strict scrutiny test to 
judicial review of state and local government affirmative action programs); see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (mandating the use of strict scrutiny test for federal race-based preference programs.)  
See generally, Leslie Yalof Garfield, Squaring Affirmative Action Admissions Policies with Federal Judicial Guidelines: A 
Model for the Twenty-First Century, 22 J.C. & U.L. 895 (1996). 
43 476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
44 Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and O’Connor joined the opinion. 
45 476 U.S. at 274. The Board of Education justified this race-based policy on the need for diverse role models 
for its students. Id.
46 Id. at 267. 
47 480 U.S. 149 (1987). 
10
promotion plan that the Alabama Department of Public Safety adopted pursuant to a 
District Court consent decree.48 Since its mandate to promote some state troopers based on 
race was a race-conscious policy, the Court applied a strict scrutiny standard.49 The Court 
would uphold the decree only if the policy was “narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling 
governmental interest.”50 Relying on Wygant, Justice Brennan acknowledged that there is a 
compelling governmental interest in remedying present effects of past discrimination.51
However, because the Court had not previously defined precisely what “narrowly tailored” 
meant, it availed itself of the opportunity to provide further guidance to future courts and 
articulated the narrowly tailored element of the strict scrutiny test.  The Justices unanimously 
concluded that the appropriate considerations for finding whether a race-based program was 
narrowly tailored included: (1) the necessity for the relief and the efficacy of alternative 
remedies; (2) the flexibility and duration of the relief; (3) the relationship between the 
numerical goals and the relevant labor market; and (4) the impact of the relief on the rights 
of third parties.52 
48 Id. The consent decree required the Department of Public Safety to institute this plan as an interim measure 
to ensure the promotion of black state troopers.  Id. The plan followed years of court battles and ineffective 
consent decrees in response to the Department’s “systematic and perpetual” discrimination against black state 
troopers.  Id. at 153.  Appellants challenged the consent decree, claiming the plan granted preferential treatment 
to Black state troopers, thereby violating the Equal Protection Clause.  Id. at 150.  
49 Id. at 167. 
50 The Justices agreed that the circumstances preceding the need for the consent decree, and the lower court’s 
decision to issue the decree, sufficiently demonstrated a compelling governmental interest in remedying past 
and present discrimination by a state actor.  Id. at 185.  Justice Brennan, with whom Justices Marshall, 
Blackmun, and Powell joined, concluded that even under a strict scrutiny analysis, the one-black-to-one-white 
promotion requirement was permissible under the Equal Protection Clause.  Id. at 186.  Justice Powell, joined 
by Justice Stevens, concurred.  These five Justices found that the one-black-to-one-white hiring program was 
narrowly tailored to achieve the goal of remedying proven discrimination.  Id.
51 Paradise, 480 U.S. at 183-85. 
52 Id. at 171; see also Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 487 (1986) (POWELL, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in judgment).  The Court held that the one-for-one promotion policy was justified by 
compelling governmental interest in present effects of past discriminatory exclusion of African-American 
police officers.  The Majority further concluded,  
[w]hen considered in light of these factors, it was amply established, and we find that the one-
for-one promotion requirement was narrowly tailored to serve its several purposes, both as 
applied to the initial set of promotions to the rank of corporal and as a continuing contingent 
order with respect to the upper ranks. 
11
Following Paradise, for the next 15 years, the Court continued to consider a series of 
affirmative action challenges, all of which considered state or federal policies aimed at 
eradicating discrimination in the employment sector.  When reading these together with 
Wygant, Paradise, and Bakke, one could articulate a clear understanding of the Court’s 
meaning of “strict scrutiny.”  The goals of eradicating present effects of past 
discrimination,53 or of achieving diversity in the classroom, could support a compelling 
governmental interest.54 The Court also provided a further understanding of the meaning of 
each of the four prongs of the Paradise narrowly tailored test.   
Regarding the first prong of the test, the necessity of the relief and the efficacy of 
alternative remedies, the Court concluded that it would not uphold a benign race-based 
remedial policy unless the policy was the least intrusive and most effective means to achieve 
the goals of the entity’s program.55 In determining whether a program satisfies this element, 
the Court would consider the purpose the program is designed to serve, the policy reasons 
for the program, and the availability of alternative relief.56 The Court has made clear that an 
Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171-72.  The consent decrees demonstrated the necessity of the relief.  Id. at 
171.  “The remedy imposed here is an effective, temporary, and flexible measure.  It applies only if 
qualified [B]lacks are available, only if the Department has an objective need to make promotions, 
and only if the Department fails to implement a promotion procedure that does not have an adverse 
impact on [B]lacks.”  Id. at 185.  This Court should not second-guess the lower court’s carefully 
considered choice of the figure necessary to achieve its many purposes, especially when that figure is 
hedged about with specific qualifying measures designed to prevent any unfair impact that might 
arise from rigid application. 
53 See, Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986); see also Richmond v. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 
(1989); see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
54 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314-15. 
55 See generally Bakke, 438 U.S. at 266. 
56 See, Paradise, 480 U.S. at 170-74.  See Garfield, supra note 10 at n.114-118.  The Court has held that relief is 
necessary where a federally-funded entity predicates professional advancement on tests that yield a variable 
achievement rate for different races or ethnicities.  See Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Service Comm. of N.Y., 463 
U.S. 582, (1983).  For example, Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission of New York, considered the 
necessity for an alternative to an examination-based police hiring program.  Petitioners, Black and Hispanic 
police officers, were appointed to the New York City Police Department (NYPD) upon passing the 
examinations administered for entry level appointments.  Id.  As a group, the test scores of Black and Hispanic 
police officers were well below the test scores of non-minority candidates.  Id.  Since appointments were made 
based on test scores, the examinations caused Blacks and Hispanics to be hired later than most non-minority 
candidates.  Id. at 582.  The NYPD also fired police officers on a last-hired first-fired basis.  Thus, more often 
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affirmative action policy will not be deemed “flexible, waivable, and temporary in nature” 
unless it is easily adaptable to changing governmental needs (flexible), easily terminated when 
not needed (waivable), and limited in duration (temporary).57 In analyzing the “relationship 
of numerical goals to relevant population,” a reviewing court must consider the numerical 
relationship between an entity’s goals for its race-based program and the desired end of the 
program.58 The court may find that the program’s numerical goals bear a reasonable 
relationship to the relevant population when the policy’s goals are measured against a 
population more closely tied to the particular group of individuals the policy seeks to 
benefit.59 Finally, the requirement that the policy not favor one group over another is really 
a rule-based definition of the Equal Protection Clause.  Congress adopted the Equal 
Protection Clause to ensure that minorities, particularly African-Americans, were not denied 
equal treatment under the law.60 However, as programs and polices aimed at benefiting 
African-Americans and other minorities became more popular, particularly following 
than not, Blacks and Hispanics were fired first.  Id. at 565-86.  The Court concluded that the performance on 
the examination yielded a disproportionate representation of Blacks and Hispanics on the police force. 
Consequently, there was a need for relief from the discriminatory effect of the standardized examination. 
57 See Paradise, 480 U.S. at 178; City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989).  In Croson, the Court struck 
down the Minority Business Enterprise legislation since it did not have either a specific termination date or, at a 
minimum, a provision for reviewing the legislation.  Id. The Paradise Court found the one-black-to-one-white 
hiring plan met the second element of the narrowly tailored test, since the district court mandated the hiring 
program only for as long as the department continued to prohibit minorities from being promoted.  Id. at 178.  
Additionally, under the consent decree, the court could easily eliminate the program once Alabama’s 
Department of Public Safety promoted a reasonable number of Black and Hispanic troopers by no longer 
mandating the state’s method of promotion.  Id. at 163-64.  Thus, a program or policy will pass the second 
element of the narrowly tailored test if the reviewing court can identify a termination provision with a quick 
method of eliminating the policy once the federally funded entity meets the goals of the policy or program. 
The Court will conclude that a need for relief exists when an “objective” test yields a discriminatory 
result.  Id. at 171.  The Court has also found a need for relief from educational policies that result in 
discrimination or separation by race.  See United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727, 2743 (1992).  Thus, it is 
likely that where the Court finds that “objective” tests infringe on the rights of individuals to advance based on 
race, the Court will find that relief is necessary and must be achieved in the least intrusive manner. 
58 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1985).  Statistical proof as evidence of its remedial purpose 
supplies the court with a means for determining that the entity offering the remedial policy had a “firm basis 
for concluding that remedial action was appropriate.”  Id. at 292. 
59 Croson, 488 U.S. at 469. 
60 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 286.  The Equal Protection Clause became a vehicle to ensure that African-Americans 
received “the same rights and opportunities that white people take for granted.”  Id. at 287. 
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Congressional enactment of the Civil Rights Act, the Court began to use the Equal 
Protection Clause to safeguard the treatment white males previously took for granted. 
 Following Paradise, the Court considered a series of challenges to affirmative action 
programs, all of which were focused on the constitutional validity of programs aimed at 
eradicating discrimination in the workplace.  In each case, the Court defined compelling 
governmental interest as supported by the eradication of present effects of past 
discrimination.  Because these challenges all centered on race-conscious cases aimed at 
improving diversity in the workplace, the Court did not have the opportunity to endorse 
Justice Powell’s finding that the need for diversity in the classroom supports a compelling 
governmental interest.  Opponents of affirmative action admissions policies seized upon the 
Court’s omission and challenged affirmative action admission policies on the grounds that 
they were not supported by a compelling need to eradicate present effects of past 
discrimination. 
 
B. Challenges to Affirmative Action Admission Policies in the Circuit 
Courts. 
 
In 1992, almost 15 years after the Bakke decision, individuals began a new round of 
challenges to affirmative action admissions policies.  This time, the circuit courts became the 
battleground for evaluating whether such policies were permissible under the Constitution.  
The first major post-Bakke challenge was fought in the Fifth Circuit, in Hopwood v. Texas.61 
Cheryl Hopwood, a single, Caucasian mother of two severely handicapped children, 
along with two other non-minority applicants, applied to and was rejected from the 
University of Texas Law School (“UT”) in 1992.62 At the time, UT used a dual admission 
61 861 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex. 1994), rev’d, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996). 
62 Cheryl Hopwood and three other Caucasian applicants were rejected from the school.  Id. at 564.  All four 
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policy to ensure its entering class was diverse in, among other things, race and ethnicity.63
All applicants were reviewed in a similar manner.  When rendering their decision, 
committee members were asked to consider such factors as undergraduate GPA, LSAT 
score, undergraduate major, race, gender, past work experience, and other relevant 
characteristics.  The chairman of the admissions committee assigned one subcommittee to 
consider non-minority applicants and another subcommittee to consider minority 
applicants.64 Consequently, when reviewing a particular file, a member of the minority 
subcommittee could not consider a particular application with reference to a diverse group, 
since he or she did not consider non-minority applications.  Each of the Plaintiffs’ 
applications reflected LSAT and undergraduate grade scores that were inferior to non-
minority applicants,65 but were superior to many minority candidates accepted to the law 
school that year.66 
had a marginal application, so their LSAT and undergraduate grade scores were not sufficient for acceptance 
under the school’s general admissions policy.  Id. at 563-67.  However, each of these applicant’s test scores and 
grades were superior to many minority candidates accepted to the Law School that year. Id. at 563 n.32.   
63 The court noted that the diversity admission policy was not entirely voluntary, because UT adopted the 
policy in response to the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) Texas plan.  Nonetheless, the court concluded that 
under an Equal Protection analysis, the same level of scrutiny applied to race-conscious affirmative action plans 
adopted pursuant to a consent agreement, whether or not such plans were voluntarily adopted.  Thus, the court 
would uphold the policy if it met the Supreme Court’s requirement that (1) there was a compelling 
governmental interest, and (2) the policy was narrowly tailored to achieve the goals of that interest. Id. at 569 
(quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986)); see also Richmond v. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 
469 (1989); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299. 
64 UT had two separate reviewing sub-committees.  Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 562.  The Chair of the 
Admissions Committee set a different presumptive admission or denial Texas Index (“TI”) number for 
minorities, who were reviewed by one sub-committee and for non-minorities, who were reviewed by a separate 
sub-committee.  Id. at 561.  The Admissions Committee based acceptance to UT for all applicants on an index 
number that is a function of each applicant’s combined undergraduate grade point average (“UGPA”) and 
LSAT score.  Id. at 557 n.9.  The Chair of the Admissions Committee initially reviewed all applications 
regardless of the applicant’s residency, race or ethnic heritage, and then set a number below which students 
were presumptively denied admission, and another number above which students were automatically admitted 
to the school.  Id. at 560-61.  The sub-committees reviewed applicants with numbers between the automatic 
admission and the automatic rejection numbers.  Id. at 561.  The admissions office divided non-minority files 
into groups of 30.  Three members of the non-minority sub-committee reviewed each non-minority applicant 
on an individual basis.  In contrast, the entire minority sub-committee reviewed each minority applicant as a 
group.  In theory, each member of the minority sub-committee was to be part of the sub-committee to review 
non-minority files; however, one member of the minority sub-committee did not review non-minority 
applications.  Id. at 562. 
65 The denied applicants were all white Texas residents.  Id. at 564.  Cheryl J. Hopwood had a TI of 199, and 
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Following their rejection, a Texas lawyer contacted these and other applicants 
whom the school had rejected regarding a class-action suit.  Plaintiffs agreed and 
permitted the lawyer to file a lawsuit on their behalf.67 The applicants challenged UT’s 
1992 admission policy as violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.68
In August 1994, the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas 
found that the policy failed under the strict scrutiny test.69 The court, relying on Justice 
Powell’s opinion in Bakke, found that a compelling governmental interest existed in the 
school’s 1992 admissions policy, since the school’s efforts were limited to “seeking the 
educational benefits that flow from having a diverse student body and to addressing the 
Kenneth Elliott, Douglas Carvell, and David Rogers each had a TI of 197.  Id. at 564-67.  UT contested the 
ripeness of the claims of Hopwood and Elliott, because neither was actually denied admission.  Id. at 567.  
Moreover, UT maintained that all four applicants lacked standing because they could not demonstrate that they 
would have been granted admission in the absence of the challenged admissions policy.  Id. Because the 
Plaintiffs were not considered for admission in a manner similar to minority students, the court ruled the 
applicants had standing to bring their claim.  Id. at 567-568.  See also Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Assoc. Gen. 
Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 663-64 (1993). 
66 Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 563 n.32.  Cheryl Hopwood’s UGPA was 3.8 and her LSAT was 39.  Id. at 564.  
Her father passed away when she was a young child.  While in high school, Hopwood was offered admission 
into Princeton, Penn State and Temple.  She declined admission, however, because she had to pay for her own 
education and work while attending both high school and college.  Id. at 564 n.40.  At the time of her 
application, she was married to a military serviceman and had two children, one of whom died at birth and the 
other who was diagnosed with severe birth defects.  Sam Howe Verhovek, For 4 Whites Who Sued University, Race 
is the Common Thread, N.Y. TIMES, March 23, 1996, at A6.  Hopwood declined to include any of this information 
in her application to UT.  Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 564, n.38.  She did, however, submit a letter to the Law 
School on January 22, 1992, requesting that if she were admitted, she would only be able to attend the school 
on a limited basis in her first year, due to the needs of her severely handicapped daughter.  Id. at 564.  Kenneth 
Elliott’s UGPA was 2.98 and his LSAT was 167.  He is a certified public accountant, and since receiving his 
undergraduate degree, Elliott has worked as an auditor or examiner for state agencies.  Id. at 565.  Douglas 
Carvell’s UGPA was 3.28.  Id. at 566.  After taking the LSAT twice, the first score being in the 61st percentile 
and the second in the 91st, his average score placed him in the 76th percentile.  Id. at 566 n.47.  In a letter of 
recommendation contained in Carvell’s admissions file, a professor from Hendrix College complimented 
Carvell’s intellect, but described his performance as “uneven, disappointing, and mediocre.”  Id. at 566.  David 
Rogers attained a UGPA of 3.13 and an LSAT score of 166.  In 1985, Rogers was dismissed from the 
University of Texas (undergraduate program) due to poor scholastic performance.  He then attended the 
University of Houston-Downtown, where he received his degree in professional writing in 1990.  Id. at 567. 
67 The lawyer, Steven W. Smith, became familiar with the case following his own investigation into what he 
perceived to be reverse discrimination.  Under the Texas Open Records Act, Smith obtained the names of 
dozens of applicants with relatively high UGPAs and LSAT scores, and mailed them letters requesting them to 
serve as Plaintiffs in this case.  Hopwood, Elliott, Carvell, and Rogers brought suit with Smith as their lawyer.  
Verhovek, supra note 66, at A6. 
68 Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 553. 
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present effects of past discriminatory practices.”70 The court rejected the policy, however, 
because it was not narrowly tailored to meet the goals of achieving a diverse class.71 Ms. 
Hopwood and her co-Plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Fifth Circuit.  The Court  of 
Appeals permitted the law school to reconstitute its admissions policy, allowing it to 
consider race as a factor in admissions decisions, but requiring the school to review 
minority and non-minority candidates as a group. 
A divided court72 overturned the lower court decision, permitting UT to 
reconstitute its 1992 admissions policy, and struck down the policy as violating the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.73 A majority of the panel broadly ruled 
that UT may not use race as a factor in law school admissions, and suggested that every 
school in its jurisdiction is prohibited from doing the same.74 The Majority rejected 
69 Id. at 584-85. 
70 Id. at 570 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313).  In other words, the compelling governmental interest was 
supported by both the need to diversify the school’s entering class and the present effects of past 
discrimination.  The court concluded that without the diversity admission policy, UT would not have achieved 
a diverse student body.  Id. at 572.  Recent Office of Civil Rights findings, coupled with the State’s “long 
history of discriminating against [B]lacks and Mexican Americans” and UT’s history of racial discrimination, 
were sufficient evidence to establish that the remedial purpose of UT’s diversity admission policy constituted a 
compelling governmental interest.  Id. at 572. 
71 Id. at 579.  The court found that the diversity admission policy met the first three prongs of the narrowly 
tailored test. Id. at 569-78.  First, UT sufficiently demonstrated that the race-based admissions policy was 
necessary, since it was impossible to achieve diversity without an affirmative action admission policy.  Id. at 
573.  Second, the program was temporary in nature because the objective of UT was to narrow the gap 
progressively so that at some point in time, UT would no longer need a diversity admission policy.  Id. at 575.  
Third, UT’s goals for minority enrollment as a percent of total enrollment bore a reasonable relationship to the 
percent of minority college graduates in Texas.  Id. Ultimately, the court held that the diversity admission 
policy violated the Fourteenth Amendment because it failed to afford each individual applicant a comparison 
with the entire pool of applicants.  Id. at 579.  The court recognized the laudable and imperative goal of 
diversity in the education system.  Moreover, it agreed with Justice Powell that race or ethnicity could be 
considered a “plus” factor in a school’s consideration of a particular applicant.  Id. at 577.  The court noted that 
when weighing non-traditional factors in the admissions decision, it is permissible for an admissions committee 
to choose an applicant with a lower LSAT and/or UGPA.  Such an applicant may be preferable based on 
qualifications that include non-objective factors.  Id. Thus, the court ruled in a manner consistent with Bakke,
holding that race can be a factor in considering a candidate’s application for admission, so long as a school does 
not use race to meet goals or to set quotas. 
72 It was a 2 to 1 ruling.  Judge Jerry Smith delivered the opinion of the court, with Judge Weiner filing a 
specially occurring opinion.   
73 Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 934-35 (5th Cir. 1996).  
74 Id. at 962.  The panel also dismissed an appeal requesting intervention in the case by two Black student 
groups for lack of jurisdiction.  Id. at 959. 
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Justice Powell’s holding in Bakke75 that there is a compelling governmental interest in the 
attainment of a diverse student body.  The judges wrote that Justice Powell’s opinion in 
Bakke was not binding, since it was not the general consensus of the Court.76
The Hopwood Majority’s rejection of Justice Powell’s decision in Bakke prompted 
many to speculate that the Supreme Court would take certiorari following UT’s appeal.  On 
July 1, 1996, however, the Supreme Court denied the state’s petition for certiorari,77 thereby 
letting the Fifth Circuit decision stand.  Although there was no opinion accompanying the 
decision,78 Justice Ginsburg wrote a brief concurrence, joined by Justice Souter.  Justice 
Ginsburg explained her decision to deny certiorari was based on a finding that UT had already 
changed its 1992 admissions policy to reflect the District Court decision, making the issue 
moot.79 She suggested, however,  that there would be a time in the future when the Court 
would address “the important question raised in this opinion.”80 
75 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
76 Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944.  In order to establish a compelling governmental interest, the judges looked to the 
Supreme Court’s definition of a compelling governmental interest in Title VII employment discrimination 
cases.  The judges would only find a compelling governmental interest if there were present effects of past 
discrimination.  Id. at 949.  As evidence of the present effects of past discrimination, the lower court relied on 
the Office of Civil Rights findings of discrimination throughout the Law School and the entire UT system.  In 
contrast, the Fifth Circuit Majority defined the proper unit for analysis of the effects of discrimination as the 
Law School.  Id. At UT, the judges held, there were no recognizable present effects of the Law School’s past 
discrimination.  Id. at 951.  The Majority concluded that since UT could not show prior discrimination by the 
Law School, it could not use race as a factor in deciding which applicants to admit in order to achieve a diverse 
student body.  Id. at 962.  In a concurring opinion, Judge Weiner agreed that the 1992 UT admissions policy did 
not pass strict scrutiny. Id. at 966.  The UT policy was not narrowly tailored to achieve diversity, since it set one 
TI range for African-Americans, a different range for Mexican-Americans, and a different range for other races.  
Id. at 936.  However, Judge Weiner disagreed with the Majority, saying that diversity could never support a 
compelling governmental interest.  Id. at 962.  He wrote that Supreme Court precedent supports the 
proposition that achieving diversity in a public graduate or professional school could be a compelling 
governmental interest.  Id. at 964.  Ultimately, Judge Weiner wrote that the definition and application of a 
compelling governmental interest where education is concerned should be left to constitutional interpretation, 
and he perceived “no ‘compelling’ reason to rush in where the Supreme Court fears – or at least declines – to 
tread.”  Id. at 965. 
77 Texas v. Hopwood, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996). 
78 Id. (writing, “Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
denied.”). 
79 Id.
80 Id. at 2582 (stating, “we must await a final judgment on a program genuinely in controversy before addressing 
the important question raised in this petition.”).  Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence in the denial of certiorari 
suggests that the definition of a compelling governmental interest in educational race-based programs remains 
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In the years following Hopwood, new affirmative action challenges in the federal 
courts attempted to force the Court, both directly and indirectly, to resolve the critical 
question of whether Justice Powell’s plurality definition of the compelling governmental 
interest prong of the strict scrutiny test was binding.  Many of these challenges stalled in the 
District Courts.81 Between 2000 and 2002, however, four cases reached various Courts of 
Appeals on the merits of whether the affirmative action admissions policies of post-
secondary institutions violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States 
Constitution.  The holdings of these cases created a clear split among the Circuits, which 
ultimately forced the Supreme Court to resolve the issue of the weight of Justice Powell’s 
opinion in Bakke.
In Smith v. University of Washington Law School,82 the Ninth Circuit ruled Justice 
Powell’s opinion in Bakke was binding on its court, and that “the attainment of a diverse 
open to Supreme Court consideration. 
81 See Texas v. Lesage, 528 U.S. 18 (1999).  Most stalled because of lack of standing.  In the only affirmative 
action case to reach the Supreme Court since Bakke in 1971, prior to the recent ascension of Gratz, 123 S. Ct. 
2411 (2003) and Grutter, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003), the Court was unable to issue a ruling on the merits of the 
University of Texas’ admissions policy; rather the Court held that “where there is no allegation of an on-going 
or imminent constitutional violation to support a claim for forward-looking relief, the government’s conclusive 
demonstration that it would have made the same decision absent the alleged discrimination precludes any 
finding of liability.”  Lesage, 528 U.S. at 21.  Not only did the Supreme Court rely on the school’s showing that 
Lesage was denied admission for race-neutral reasons, the Court also relied on Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F.Supp. 
551 (1994), in part, to find that Lesage lacked standing to pursue his discrimination claim.  Lesage, 528 U.S. at 
22.  The University of Texas did not deny that the year Lesage applied, the school considered race at some 
point during its admissions process.  Id. at 19.  However, the decision in Hopwood being binding on the Texas 
school, the Supreme Court was satisfied that Lesage was barred from seeking forward-looking relief.  Id. at 22.  
Although the Supreme Court was not in a position to evaluate the University of Texas’ use of race in its 
admissions policy given its finding that Lesage lacked standing, its reliance on Hopwood in issuing this ruling 
added a hint of legitimacy to Hopwood itself.   
Despite that an affirmative action case has reached Court of Appeals in nearly every circuit, many 
have applied the Supreme Court’s holding in Lesage to sidestep the issue of whether race-conscious admissions 
policies are constitutional.  In both Farmer v. Ramsay, 43 Fed. Appx. 547 (2002), and Wooden v. Bd. of Regents of the 
Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 247 F.3d 1262 (2001), the court held that the respective Plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue 
the issue.  Rather than examine either schools’ admitted use of race in its admissions policy, the courts spent 
much of their opinion recounting the Plaintiffs’ applications and the race-neutral reasons that the schools 
rejected the applicants.  See generally Farmer, 43 Fed. Appx. 547 (2002); see generally Wooden, 247 F.3d 1262 
(2001).  Thus, these cases have added little to the discussion of whether race-conscious admissions programs 
are constitutionally permissible. 
82 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1051 (2001). 
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student body is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education.”83
In 1997, three Caucasian applicants84 to the Law School challenged the school’s affirmative 
action admissions policy on the grounds that it violated 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 
2000d.85 Plaintiffs, and the University of Washington (“UW”), as defendant, stipulated that 
from 1994 to 1998 the law school had used race as a criterion in its admissions process, so 
that it could ensure that it would enroll a diverse entering class.86 In 1998, the State of 
Washington adopted I-200,87 which precluded schools from granting “preferential 
treatment” to any individual “on the basis of race.”88 In response, the President of the 
University issued a directive, and UW voluntarily refrained from using race as a factor in its 
83 Id. at 1197.   
The district court correctly decided that Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke described the 
law and would require a determination that a properly-designed and operated race-
conscious admissions program at the Law School of the University of Washington 
would not be in violation of Title VI or the Fourteenth Amendment.  It was also correct 
when it determined that Bakke has not been overruled by the Supreme Court.  Thus, at 
our level of the judicial system, Justice Powell’s opinion remains the law.   
 
However, the Law School has encountered a peripeteia in its own state; it is bound by I-
200, which precludes it from granting ‘preferential treatment’ to any individual ‘on the 
basis of race.’ That has rendered Smith’s request for prospective relief moot because we 
‘[should] not assume that a university, professing to employ a facially nondiscriminatory 
admissions policy, would operate it as a cover for the functional equivalent of a quota 
system.  In short, good faith [should] be presumed in the absence of a showing to the 
contrary.... ’   
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318-19. 
84 On July 1, 1997, Katuria Smith, Angela Rock, and Michael Pyle filed suit against the Law School, alleging 
illegal discrimination against Caucasians and others on the basis of their race, which resulted in their being 
denied admission to the Law School.  From at least 1994 to December of 1998, the Law School did use race 
as a criterion in its admissions process, so that it could assure the enrollment of a diverse student body.  
There is no dispute about that.  Katuria Smith was denied admission in 1994, but she attended another law 
school and obtained her law degree there.  Angela Rock was denied admission in 1995.  She, too, attended 
another law school and obtained her law degree.  Michael Pyle was denied admission in 1996, but when he 
reapplied in 1999 [after the Law School terminated its overt racial policy], he was admitted.   
Smith, 233 F.3d at 1191-92.  
85 Id. at 1191.  
86 Id.
87 Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.400(1).   
88 Smith, 233 F.3d at 1192.  On November 3, 1998, the State of Washington passed Initiative Measure 200, 
which stipulated in part that, “the state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any 
individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public 
employment, public education, or public contracting.” Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.400(1).   
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admissions policy.89 Because of the Law School’s voluntary decision to comply with I-200, 
UW argued to the District Court that the issue was moot.  Plaintiffs argued that the claims 
were not moot because of the uncertainty of how the Law School would actually interpret 
and apply I-200.90 The District Court issued an order granting the motion to dismiss the 
claims for injunctive and declaratory relief, since the issue was now moot due to the State’s 
adoption of I-200.   
The court made the necessary findings under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and designated two 
controlling questions of law for the Ninth Circuit to resolve: “(1) whether educational 
diversity is a compelling governmental interest that meets the requirement of ‘strict scrutiny’ 
for race-conscious measures under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution; and (2) whether race may be considered only for remedial purposes.”91 
Plaintiffs appealed both the denial of injunctive relief and the issue on the merits.92 The 
Ninth Circuit granted both applications.93 
As to the first issue, the court found that the claim was indeed moot in light of I-
200.94 The court then considered the District Court’s decision to deny the Plaintiffs’ partial 
summary judgment motion, which found that under Bakke and its progeny, “race could be 
89 Smith, 233 F.3d at 1192.   
The new admission policy did retain a diversity clause, which stated that ‘[i]mportant 
academic objectives are furthered by...  students...  from diverse background[s]’ and then 
went on to set out a non-exhaustive list of factors as indicative of diversity including 
‘persevering or personal adversity or other social hardships; having lived in a foreign 
country or spoken a language other than English at home; career goals…; employment 
history; educational background…; evidence of and potential for leadership…; special 
talents…; geographic diversity or unique life experiences.’  Race itself, along with color 
and national origin, were excluded from the list. 
Id.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 1192. 
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Smith, 233 F.3d at 1193.  The court found that the district court had properly determined that it could offer 
no relief of a prospective nature once I-200 and its aftermath had accomplished all that a judgment could 
accomplish.  The court noted that time and events, including societal opinion, outstripped the court 
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used as a factor in educational admissions decisions, even where that was not done for 
remedial purposes.”95 In upholding the District Court’s finding that UW could consider race 
as a factor in its admissions policy, Judge Fernandez acknowledged that the Supreme Court 
clearly required that any affirmative action admissions policy was subject to the strictest 
scrutiny, and would not be permissible unless it was narrowly tailored to meet a compelling 
governmental interest.96 Adopting the language from Justice Powell’s opinion, Judge 
Fernandez concluded, “[t]he State certainly has a legitimate and substantial interest in 
ameliorating, or eliminating where feasible, the disabling effects of identified 
discrimination,”97 and the attainment of a diverse student body “is a constitutionally 
permissible goal for an institution of higher education.”98 Thus, “ethnic diversity” can be 
“one element in a range of factors a university properly may consider in attaining the goal of 
a heterogeneous student body.”99 Ultimately, the court concluded that the Plaintiffs’ claims 
for declaratory and injunctive relief were moot, and therefore never considered the issue of 
whether UW’s program was narrowly tailored.100 
In 2001, following Smith, the Eleventh Circuit came to the contrary conclusion 
regarding the validity of Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke. In Johnson v. Board of Regents for the 
University of Georgia,101 the Court considered an appeal from the District Court, which held 
that the University of Georgia’s (“UGA”) policy of awarding a fixed numerical bonus to 
non-white and male applicants, which it did not give to white and female applicants, was 
processes.  Id.
95 Id. at 1196.  
96 Id. at 1197.  
97 Id. (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978)).  
98 Id. (quoting Bakke 438 U.S. 265, 311-312 (1978)). 
99 Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 at 314.  “It has declared that “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single 
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as 
that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.’”  Smith, 
233. F.3d at 1199 (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)). 
100 See id. at  1195.   
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unconstitutional.102 On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, UGA argued that the school’s policy 
should be upheld because it was narrowly tailored to meet what Justice Powell acknowledged 
in Bakke as a compelling governmental interest in admitting a diverse class.103 The Majority 
concluded that Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke was not binding under Marks v. United 
States,104 which held that “when a fragmented Court decides a case... the holding of the Court 
may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on 
the narrowest grounds.”105 Applying a Marks-type analysis, the Johnson Court concluded, 
similarly to Hopwood, that Justice Powell’s decision, read with Justice Brennan’s concurrence, 
supported the very narrow principle that race could never be a factor in admissions 
policies.106 For these reasons, the Eleventh Circuit clearly articulated its conclusion that 
Justice Powell’s decision was not binding on its court.107 
Despite its findings, the court was still willing to uphold the policy if it passed the 
strict scrutiny test, as articulated in Paradise. First, UGA had to demonstrate that its policy 
was designed to eradicate present effects of past discrimination.108 Secondly, the school had 
to prove that it’s policy was narrowly tailored to meet the stated compelling governmental 
interest. 
The Johnson court was the first to note that the Paradise test, while useful, was not 
ideal for evaluating an affirmative action admissions policy.  Because neither the Eleventh 
Circuit or the Supreme Court “has had occasion to define the contours of the narrow 
101 263 F.3d 1234 (11th  Cir. 2001). 
102 106 F. Supp. 2d 1362 (S.D. Ga. 2000). 
103 Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1245. 
104 430 U.S. 188 (1977).  
105 Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1245 (quoting Marks, 430 U.S. at 193).  
106 Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1248. 
107 Id. at 1245.  “Simply put, Justice Powell’s opinion does not establish student body diversity as a compelling 
interest for purposes of this case.”  Id. at 1249.  The Court also said, “We need not, and do not, resolve in 
this opinion whether student body diversity ever may be a compelling interest supporting a university’s 
consideration of race in its admissions process.”  Id. at 1244.   
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tailoring inquiry in a case involving a university’s race-conscious admissions policy,”109 the 
court took it upon itself to propose a modified Paradise test, which better suited evaluating 
race-conscious policies set to achieve diversity in the classroom.  Under the Johnson test,  
a court evaluating a school admissions program designed to serve a 
compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits associated with a 
diverse student body should examine: (1) whether the policy uses race in a 
rigid or mechanical way that does not take sufficient account of the different 
contributions to diversity that individual candidates may offer; (2) whether 
the policy fully and fairly takes account of race-neutral factors which may 
contribute to a diverse student body; (3) whether the policy gives an arbitrary 
or disproportionate benefit to members of the favored racial groups; and (4) 
whether the school has genuinely considered, and rejected as inadequate, 
race-neutral alternatives for creating student body diversity.  The foregoing 
factors essentially correspond to all of the factors adopted in Paradise (other 
than duration) for affirmative action plans generally.110 
Ultimately, the court struck down UGA’s policy as failing the narrowly tailored test.  Its 
policy of awarding diversity “bonus” points to certain applicants granted a disproportionate 
benefit to non-white applicants.111 The court advanced solid reasons for its modification of 
the Paradise test.  At the outset, inquiring into “the relationship between the numerical goal 
and the percentage of minority group members in the relevant population” may be unhelpful 
where the university does not target a specific number of minority applicants for 
admission.”112 In addition, “a limited inquiry into “the flexibility of the policy” may not 
adequately reflect the paramount importance of the requirement that, to serve validly the end 
of diversity, a race-conscious admissions policy…assess each applicant as an individual 
rather than a member of a particular racial group.”113 Ultimately Judge Marcus, writing for 
108 Id. at 1252.  Burden lay with party proposing the program.  Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 1253. 
111 Id. at 1254. 
112 Id. at 1252. 
113 Id. Judge Marcus further wrote, “Similarly, while it may be constitutionally acceptable in limited 
circumstances for ‘innocent’ members of a once-favored racial group to bear some burden when a defendant 
seeks to remediate its past discrimination, this view of competing racial groups has no meaning when a 
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the Majority, advanced that the Paradise narrowly tailored test was inappropriate for 
considering challenges to affirmative action admission policies. 
The same year that the Eleventh Circuit decided Johnson, the Sixth Circuit was faced 
with two appeals concerning affirmative action admissions policies: one at the undergraduate 
level and one at the graduate level of the University of Michigan.  The first challenge, Gratz 
v. Bollinger, was filed by a Caucasian female and a Caucasian male, each of whom were denied 
admission to the University of Michigan’s School of Literature Arts and Science (“LSA”).114 
Jennifer Gratz and Patrick Hamacher challenged LSA’s admissions policy, alleging that it 
improperly used race as a factor, in violation of 42 USC §§ 1981 and 1983, and the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.115 
The Faculty at the University of Michigan had adopted its admissions policy to 
accomplish its stated goal of admitting a diverse class, for the benefit of all students in the 
classroom.116 From 1995 to 1998, LSA’s admissions policy specifically “protected” a certain 
number of spots for minority candidates.117 In 1999, LSA modified its admissions program.  
The school used a 150-point scale, which it called a SCUGA scale, to rate applicants.118 
Students received a certain number of points for scholarship, curriculum, under-represented 
minority status, geographical location, and alumni relation.  Students were assigned 20 points 
university’s professed goal is to create a diverse student body, and the burden imposed by a racial preference 
intended to achieve diversity cannot so readily be justified on this basis.” Id. 
114 Gratz v. Bollinger, 183 F.R.D. 209, 210 (E.D. Mich. 1998).  The complaint was filed on 10/14/97.  Id.  
115 Id.  
116 Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F.Supp. 2d 811, 814 (E.D. Mich. 2000). 
117 Id. at 826-27.  “Grids” were used to help review applicants; there were separate grids for minority and non-
minority students.  Id. at 827.  On these grids, SAT scores were represented on the horizontal axis and high 
school grade point average on the vertical axis.  Id. at 826.  The admissions office would plot an applicant’s 
SAT and High School GPA on the grid to determine whether the applicant should be reviewed for admission. 
Id. at 826-27.  The LSA used a rolling admissions policy, which meant that as applications were being received, 
applicants were continuously being accepted and enrolled.  The rolling admissions made it more difficult for 
the LSA to ensure that a critical mass of minority applicants were accepted.  Id. at 831.  To rectify this problem, 
they reserved a specific number of seats for minority students, which guaranteed that there would be enough 
minority students in the incoming class.  Id. 
118 Gratz, 122 F.Supp. 2d at 827-29.  The SCUGA factors were: S-socioeconomic status, C-curriculum, U-
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if they were under-represented minorities.119 LSA did not set aside a fixed number of seats 
for applicants.120 
The admissions committee reviewed only applicants who attained a certain SCUGA 
number.121 Once an applicant earned enough points to make it to the individual review 
phase of the admissions policy, the committee disregarded the applicant’s SCUGA score. 
Rather, it paid particular attention to the qualities that would make the candidate a suitable 
student for matriculation at the school.122 LSA also had a policy of allowing counselors to 
“flag” applications of certain students who would otherwise not have passed the first 
selection procedure, allowing for a limited number of applicants, who did not have the 
necessary SCUGA score, to be considered in the individual review phase of the admissions 
proceedings.123 
The trial court, following the Supreme Court’s mandate, considered whether LSA’s 
declared goal of achieving a racially diverse class was a compelling governmental interest, 
and whether the SCUGA number system was narrowly tailored to meet that interest.  The 
District Court rejected the 1995-1998 plan,124 but held that the SCUGA plan, which was 
underrepresented minority, G-geography, A-alumni.   
119 Id. at 827. 
120 See id. at 825. 
121 See Gratz, 123 S.Ct. at 2419. 
122 See id. at 2420.  Under the 1999 admissions program,  
Counselors may flag an applicant for review by the committee if he or she is academically 
prepared, has a [certain] selection index score..., and possesses one of several qualities valued 
by the University.  These qualities include “high class rank, unique life experiences, 
challenges, circumstances, interests or talents, socioeconomic disadvantage, and under-
represented race, ethnicity, or geography.” 
Id. at 2432.  “[I]n ‘rare circumstances,’ an admissions counselor may flag an applicant with a selection index 
score below the designated levels if the counselor has reason to believe from reading the entire file that the 
score does not reflect the applicant’s true promise.”  Id. 
123 Gratz, 122 F.Supp. 2d at 827.   
124 Id. at 831-33.  The Court held that the admissions plan from 1995-1998 was not narrowly tailored.  Id.  
There were separate grids for minorities and because of that, a certain number of non-minority students would 
be automatically rejected without even having their applications examined. Id. at 832-33.  The Court held that 
the separate grids might not be constitutionally impermissible on their face, but when combined with the 
automatic exclusions and the seats that were reserved for minorities, the program was unconstitutional.  Id. at 
833. 
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adopted in 1999, was indeed narrowly tailored to meet a compelling governmental interest of 
achieving a diverse classroom.125 Plaintiffs appealed to the Sixth Circuit. 
Concurrent with the Court’s consideration of Gratz, Barbara Grutter challenged the 
University of Michigan Law School’s (“Law School”) admissions policy.126 The Law 
School’s 1992 admissions policy called for enrollment of a “critical mass of minority 
students” as a means of ensuring a diverse student body.127 Under the written policy, the 
school gave considerable weight to an applicant’s undergraduate GPA and his or her Law 
School Admissions Test (“LSAT”) scores.128 Applicants who were not automatically 
admitted or rejected based on objective scores were sent to the committee for review.  
According to the Law School’s written policy, those reviewing applications for admission 
were encouraged to consider factors including recommendations, quality of one’s 
125 Gratz, 122 F.Supp. 2d at 831-33.  The LSA defended their program as narrowly tailored to achieve the 
compelling interest of diversity. Id at 816.  The Defendant-Intervenors presented a separate justification for the 
program.  They maintained that the admissions program was additionally constitutional as a remedy for the 
past and current effects of racial discrimination.  Id. The Court held this was not a compelling interest.  The 
Court held that the legal standard was that the discrimination must be “identified discrimination.” Gratz v. 
Bollinger, 135 F.Supp.2d 790, 792-92 (E.D. Mich. 2001).  There must be a strong basis in the evidence that the 
remedial action is necessary before the affirmative action program can be used.  Id. at 793-94.  A generalized 
assertion of past discrimination is not enough.  Id. at 793.  When the race-based classifications of an affirmative 
action plan are challenged, the proponents of the plan have the burden of persuasion.  Id. The Plaintiffs 
initially argued that since the school maintains that their program is intended to achieve diversity, the 
Defendant-Intervenors could not say that it is to rectify past discrimination.  Id. at 794-95.  The Court 
disagreed and said that in affirmative action cases, you must look beyond the articulated reason and see if it is 
genuine; the Defendant-Intervenors were allowed to present evidence on this issue.  Id.  The Defendant-
Intervenors presented evidence about past and present racial discrimination and hostility.  The Court believed 
that there was racial hostility on campus, but that there was not enough evidence that the University was a 
participant in it and it did not meet the level of a compelling interest, which would justify an affirmative action 
program.  Id. at 792-802. 
126 Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F.Supp. 2d 821, 823 (E.D. Mich. 2001). 
127 Id. at 832.  The Law School’s admissions policy was adopted in 1992 and it expresses the school’s desire “to 
admit a group of students who individually and collectively are among the most capable students applying to 
American law schools in a given year.... Collectively, we seek a mix of students with varying backgrounds and 
experiences who will respect and learn from each other.”  Id. at 825.  The policy stated that while grades would 
be a factor, the rationale for admitting students with lower scores was because they “may help achieve that 
diversity which has the potential to enrich everyone’s education and thus make a law school class stronger than 
the sum of its parts.”  Id. at 827.  The School hoped that “[b]y enrolling a ‘critical mass’ of minority students, 
we have ensured their ability to make unique contributions to the character of the Law School.”  Id. at 828. 
128 Grutter, 137 F.Supp. 2d at 825-26. The objective factors of each candidate were initially evaluated on a grid 
with an applicant’s undergraduate GPA plotted on a vertical axis and his or her LSAT score plotted on a 
horizontal axis.  As an applicant’s objective numbers move to the upper right of the grid, his or her chances of 
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undergraduate institution, essays, course selection, and whether the applicant had a 
perspective or experience that would contribute to a diverse student body.129 The policy 
highlighted examples of those who could offer varying perspectives, including a concert 
pianist, someone who spoke five languages, or a member of an underrepresented minority 
group.130 
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern 
Division, subjected the Law School’s admissions policy to strict scrutiny.  The court 
concluded that Justice Powell’s majority opinion in Bakke was not binding, and therefore the 
Law School’s mission of admitting a diverse class was not a compelling governmental 
interest to justify including race in the list of non-objective factors that could contribute to 
an applicant’s success.131 The U.S. District Court further found that the admissions policy 
was not narrowly tailored, concluding that the Law School’s goal of admitting a “critical 
mass” was practically indistinguishable from a quota, and was such an amorphous figure that 
a program could never be narrowly tailored to achieve it.132 Judge Friedman issued an 
injunction prohibiting the Law School from considering race in its admissions policy.133 In 
admission increase.  Id.  
129 Id. at 826. 
130 Id. at 826-27. 
131 Id. at 848-49. The Defendants argued that Bakke stands for the conclusion that diversity is a compelling 
government interest, but the court disagreed.  Id. at 844.  The court held that Bakke is not binding, because 
Justice Powell’s opinion was not joined by any other Justices, and recent Supreme Court cases have not looked 
favorably on racial classifications.  Id. at 844-46.  The court agreed that diversity does have important 
educational benefits, but felt that a distinction needs to be drawn between viewpoint diversity and racial 
diversity.  Id. at 849.  The court felt that viewpoint diversity provides benefits but that the connection between 
race and viewpoint is tenuous.  Id. Therefore, racial diversity is not a compelling interest.  Id. 
132 Id. at 851.  The court found that the school’s policy was not narrowly tailored because: 1) since “critical 
mass” is such an amorphous figure, there is no way that a program can be narrowly tailored to achieve it; 2) the 
use of race is not limited in time and the Supreme Court has been highly critical of programs that are not 
limited in duration; 3) the school’s desire to achieve a critical mass is practically indistinguishable from a quota 
system; 4) there is no logical reason why the school gave preferences to some minorities and not to others such 
as Arabs and southern and eastern Europeans; and 5) the Law School has apparently failed to investigate 
alternative means for achieving minority enrollment.  Id. at 850-52.   
133 Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F.Supp.2d 874 (E.D. Mich. 2001).  After the Grutter decision, the University 
Defendants petitioned the District Court for a stay of the injunction while the case was appealed.  Id. at 874.  
The District Court per Judge Friedman denied the motion.  Id. The District Court denied the motion because: 
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response to the District Court decision, the Law School petitioned the Sixth Circuit.134 The 
Court of Appeals heard the Grutter appeal en banc on the same day as Gratz.135 
The main issues before the Sixth Circuit were whether the District Court erred in 
concluding that Justice Powell’s opinion was not binding136 and, if so, whether the Law 
School’s admissions policy passed constitutional muster under Powell’s reasoning in 
Bakke.137 As to the first issue, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the District Court improperly 
applied a Marks analysis to the plurality opinion in Bakke.138 In Bakke, Justice Brennan’s 
concurrence, which was joined by three other Justices, signaled his agreement with Justice 
Powell that diversifying a student body could be a compelling governmental interest.139 
Furthermore, the Court found that its subsequent treatment of Bakke, in cases like Metro 
Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C.,140 supports the conclusion that Powell’s position in Bakke 
represents the holding of the case.141 Justice Martin held that since, under a Marks analysis, 
1) the Defendants did not show the existence of serious questions about the merits of the decision; 2) the Law 
School did not show a certain and immediate threat of irreparable harm; and 3) the interests of the other parties 
and the public weigh against granting the stay of the injunction.  Id. 
134 Grutter v. Bollinger, 247 F.3d 631 (6th Cir. 2001).  The United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, 
reversed the District Court because: 1) there were serious questions about the merits of the case because the 
District Courts in Grutter and Gratz had different interpretations about the meaning of Bakke, and they are both 
before the Sixth Circuit on appeal; and 2) the Law School did show irreparable harm because there would be a 
tremendous disruption of their admissions selection process for the class of 2001-2002.  Id at 633. 
135 Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2422 (2003). 
136 Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 738-39 (6th Cir. 2002). 
137 Id. at 746. 
138 Id. at 739-40.  Justice Martin, writing for the Majority, cited Mark’s holding that, “[w]hen a fragmented Court 
decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result can enjoy the assent of five Justices, the holding of 
the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgment on the 
narrowest grounds.”  Id. at 739. 
139 Id. at 741.  The Sixth Circuit explained that Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion in Bakke, used 
intermediate scrutiny, while Justice Powell used strict scrutiny.  Id. Since the set of constitutionally permissible 
uses of race under intermediate scrutiny necessarily include those permissive under strict scrutiny, Justice 
Powell’s opinion would allow the most limited use of race.  Therefore, it was the narrowest rationale that 
supported the opinion and is the binding precedent.  Id. 
140 497 U.S. 547 (1990). 
141 Grutter, 288 F.3d at 743.  The Sixth Circuit felt that their interpretation of Justice Brennan’s position in 
Bakke was correct because in Metro Broadcasting, Justice Brennan wrote an opinion that cited Bakke for the 
proposition that “‘a diverse student body’ contributing to a ‘robust exchange of ideas’ is a ‘constitutionally 
permissible goal’ on which race-conscious university admissions program may be predicated.”  Id. at 743 (citing 
Metro Broad., Inc., v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 568).  
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Justice Powell’s decision in Bakke is binding on the courts, it should remain the law until the 
Supreme Court expressly overrules it.142 
Once the Sixth Circuit concluded that the District Court misapplied controlling law, 
it considered whether, under Bakke, the Law School’s admissions policy was narrowly 
tailored to meet the compelling governmental interest of admitting a diverse entering class.  
The court recognized that the Law School’s admissions policy closely tracked the Harvard 
Plan, which the Bakke Court suggested would pass strict scrutiny.143 Specifically, the Law 
School policy did not use quotas, only considered race, ethnicity, and other soft variables as 
potential “plus” factors in an applicant’s file, and read and evaluated each applicant 
individually.144 For these reasons, it was narrowly tailored.  The court further considered the 
school’s policy of weekly reviews of the race and ethnicity of the admitted applicants.  The 
goal of this practice, according to the Law School, was to ensure that the school enrolled a 
“critical mass” of underrepresented minority students, so that a few wouldn’t feel isolated or 
as though they must be the spokesperson for an entire group of people.145 Enrolling a 
critical mass, the Law School offered, ensured that the entire class would obtain the benefits 
of an academically diverse student body.146 Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit Court was satisfied 
that a “critical mass” did not equal a quota, and the court upheld the Law School’s 
admissions policy.147 
142 Id. at 743-44. 
143 Id. at 744.  The court held that the Law School used race only as a “plus,” which closely mirrored the 
Harvard Plan cited favorably in Bakke, and was therefore narrowly tailored.  Id. In Bakke, Justice Powell held 
that the Harvard Plan was constitutional because race was only utilized as a “plus,” but did not insulate a 
minority applicant from comparison with other applicants.  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316. 
144 Grutter, 288 F.3d at 744-46. 
145 Id. at 737. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 747.  The Plaintiffs alleged that the so-called “critical mass” was in reality a disguised quota because it 
always resulted in a range of 10-17% minority students.  Id. The Sixth Circuit disagreed and held that the Law 
School had no fixed goal or target.  Id. at 747-48.  The court felt that Bakke allows schools to pay some 
attention to race and that relying on Bakke, over a period of time, will always result in a percentage range of 
minority students.  Id. at 748.  The court concluded: 
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The petitioners from the Grutter case filed a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court 
following the Sixth Circuit decision.148 The Court granted certiorari on December 2, 2002.  
The Gratz petitioners also asked the Court to grant certiorari, even though the Sixth Circuit 
had not yet rendered an opinion in that case, so that the Court could address the 
constitutionality of affirmative action admissions policies “in a wider range of 
circumstances.”149 On December 2, 2002, the Supreme Court granted their petition for 
certiorari.150 
Part II:  The Supreme Court’s Recent Application of the Strict Scrutiny Test to 
Affirmative Action Admission Policies: the Gratz and Grutter 
Decisions. 
 
On June 23, 2003, the Supreme Court of the United States issued separate opinions 
in the Grutter and Gratz cases.151 Because the Plaintiffs in each case challenged the respective 
affirmative action admissions policies as violating the Equal Protection Clause, the Court 
reviewed each policy under the strict scrutiny test.  The policies, therefore, would only 
withstand a constitutional challenge if the schools could “demonstrate that the use of race in 
[their] current admissions program[s] employ ‘narrowly tailored measures that further 
compelling governmental interests’.”152 Both the Grutter and Gratz Courts swiftly accepted, 
as binding, Justice Powell’s Majority opinion in Bakke, and presumed that there was a 
In light of (1) the overwhelming testimony by Law School Professors, admissions 
counselors and deans that the Law School does not employ a quota or otherwise reserve 
seats for under-represented minority applicants and (2) Justice Powell’s instruction that 
lower courts presume that academic institutions act in good faith in operating their 
“plus” programs, we simply cannot conclude that the Law School is using the 
“functional equivalent” of the Davis Medical School quota struck down in Bakke. 
Id. 
148 Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 617 (2002). 
149 Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2422. 
150 Gratz v. Bollinger, 537 U.S. 1044 (2002). 
151 Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2002); Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2002). 
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compelling governmental interest in achieving a diverse entering class.153 The opinions 
differed, however, in their ultimate conclusions regarding whether each school’s policy was 
narrowly tailored to meet that compelling governmental interest.  
The Gratz Court struck down LSA’s admissions policy because it was not narrowly 
tailored to meet the compelling governmental interest of achieving a diverse student body.154 
152 Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2427; Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2337-38.  
153 The lower courts had taken considerable time in their opinions to discuss whether Bakke, was binding 
precedent and reached varying conclusions.  In Grutter, the Sixth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals 
held that Bakke was binding precedent using the Supreme Court’s Marks analysis.  Grutter, 288 F.3d 732, 739-
43.  In Gratz, the United States District Court, Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division, similarly held 
that Powell’s opinion from Bakke was binding.  Gratz, 122 F.Supp. 2d 811, 819-20.  Conversely, in Grutter, the 
District Court held that Powell’s opinion from Bakke, was not binding precedent.  137 F.Supp. 2d 821, 844-50 
(E.D. Mich. 2001), rev’d by 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002).  Despite all of the controversy and varying opinions 
among the lower courts, the Supreme Court did not spend a significant amount of time addressing the issue in 
their opinion.  The Court simply stated that “today we endorse Justice Powell’s view that student body diversity 
is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions.”  Grutter, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 
2337 (2003).  
154 Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2411, 2416 (2003).  Before the Supreme Court addressed the merits of 
the case, they spent considerable time discussing whether the Plaintiff had standing to bring the case.  Id. at 
2414-15.  In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens – who was joined by Justice Souter – contended that the 
case should be dismissed because the Plaintiffs lacked standing.  Since the Petitioners had already enrolled at 
other universities before the complaint was filed, they would not benefit from the judgment and therefore 
lacked standing.  Id. at 2434.  Jennifer Gratz applied to the LSA for the 1995-1996 class, but when she was 
wait-listed, she decided to attend the University of Michigan at Dearborn, which she graduated from in 1999.  
Id. Patrick Hamacher applied to the LSA for the 1997-1998 class, but when he was wait-listed he decided to 
attend Michigan State University and graduated in 2001.  Id. Hamacher alleged that he intended to apply to 
transfer to the LSA if the admissions policies were altered.  Id. When the petitioners applied for class action 
certification under FRCP 23(b) to seek declaratory and injunctive relief, the University challenged their petition 
by pointing out that Hamacher suffered “no threat of imminent injury” and could therefore not be a class 
representative.  Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2434.  The District Court disagreed and held that Hamacher had standing 
to seek injunctive relief because of his intent to transfer.  Id. In the subsequent case, the Court held that the 
LSA’s admissions policies from 1995-1998 (which were in place when the petitioners applied) were 
unconstitutional, while the new policy for 1999-2000 was constitutional.  Id. at 2435.  When the petitioners 
sought certiorari on the ruling for the policy from 1999-2000, the LSA did not cross-motion for a review of the 
ruling on the policies for 1995-1998.  Id. Justice Stevens held, therefore, that the only part of the case before 
the Court is the District Court’s judgment upholding the LSA’s new policies.  Id. Justice Stevens held that 
petitioners had standing to seek damages for wrongful denial of their applications, but that these past damages 
did not impose standing to seek injunctive relief for future third parties because one must show that one 
personally faces an imminent threat of future injury.  Id. Justice Stevens did not believe that Hamacher’s intent 
to transfer conveyed standing because 1) there is no evidence that he actually applied to transfer; 2) the transfer 
policy was not addressed by the District Court and is not before the Supreme Court, and differs significantly 
from the normal admissions policy including the fact that it does not use the point system; and 3) the 
differences in the policies make it unlikely that an injunctive modification of the freshman admissions policies 
would affect the transfer policy.  Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2436-37.  Justice Stevens also held that the class action 
certification did not grant standing because the class representatives must still show that they have been 
personally injured.  Id. at 2437-38.   
The Majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, disagreed and held that the Plaintiffs do 
have standing.  The Majority held that it is not determinative for the issue of standing whether Hamacher 
actually applied to transfer.  Id. at 2422.  The Majority pointed out that Stevens’ questioning of the issue directly 
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Writing for the Majority,155 Chief Justice Rehnquist found that the fatal flaw in the 
University’s admissions policy was its failure to provide an individual review of each 
candidate.156 LSA’s policy of automatically distributing 20 points to every applicant from the 
“under-represented minority” applicant pool had the result of treating race as an absolute, 
“which could jettison a member of an underrepresented group into the accept[ed] category, 
regardless of the experiences or qualities that race had contributed to the development of the 
individual.”157 
In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court failed to specifically rely on the four-
pronged narrowly tailored test it had previously articulated in Paradise. Instead, it relied on 
Justice Powell’s language in Bakke, which it decided prior to Paradise as controlling of the 
issue.158 LSA’s policy went beyond the spirit of Justice Powell’s edict that race can be 
considered a factor in admissions, since it failed to allow for interpretation of “individual 
qualities or experience not dependent upon race but sometimes associated with it.”159 
Therefore, the program was not narrowly drawn in a constitutionally permissible way. 
conflicted with the finding of fact made by the District Court, which held Hamacher “intends to transfer to the 
University of Michigan when defendants cease the use of race as an admission preference.”  Id. The Majority 
also held that it was well established that intent can be relevant to standing in the context of Equal Protection 
challenges.  Id. Since Hamacher was ready to transfer if the LSA stopped using race, he had standing to seek 
injunctive relief with respect to the LSA’s use of race in undergraduate admissions.  Id.at 2423.  The Majority 
also disagreed with Justice Stevens about the differences between the admissions policies.  Id. The Petitioners 
were challenging the use of race in undergraduate admissions and sought injunctive relief prohibiting the use of 
race.  The District Court certified the class and found that Hamacher was a valid class representative.  Id. at 
2424. The differences in the policies were not that great and when the University challenged Hamacher’s 
standing they did not raise the issue of the differences in the policies.  The Majority held that Hamacher had 
standing to seek injunctive relief.  Id. at 2422.   
155 Joined by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas. 
156 Id. at 2431.  “[T]he Court finds that the University’s current policy, which automatically distributes 20 
points, or one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee admission, to every single ‘underrepresented minority’ 
applicant solely because of race, is not narrowly tailored to achieve educational diversity.” Id. at 2415. 
157 Id.  
158 “In Bakke, Justice Powell’s opinion emphasized that when using race in admissions each applicant had to be 
considered as an individual.”  Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2415. In this case, the LSA automatically gave 20 points to 
all minority applicants.  Id. at 2431. This automatic granting of points to all minority applicants precluded the 
individualized review that Powell cited in Bakke. Id. 
159 Id. at 2429 (quoting Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2765 (1978)). Again relying on Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke, 
the District Court determined that the admissions program the LSA began using in 1999 is a narrowly tailored 
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The Majority found LSA’s policy flawed, since the individual review was provided 
only after admissions counselors automatically assigned points to a candidate.160 They 
rejected the University’s concern that the volume of applications made it impractical for LSA 
to use an admissions system primarily based on individual review, and thus automatic 
assignment was the only means to efficiently consider the volume of applicants it received 
each year.161 In response, the Court wrote, “the fact that the implementation of a program 
capable of providing individualized consideration might present administrative challenges 
does not render constitutional an otherwise problematic system.”162 
In her concurrence, Justice O’Connor elaborated on the fatal flaw of LSA’s policy.  
LSA’s practice of assigning points to applicants merely because they are members of a 
particular class precluded the committee from considering the effect race had on the 
individual, and his or her ability to contribute to meaningful class discussion.163 Under LSA’s 
policy, “under-represented minority” status had the effect of almost guaranteeing acceptance 
to the school, rather than serving as a contributing factor in the decision-making process.  
Justice O’Connor acknowledged that an applicant could acquire a significant number of 
means of achieving the University’s interest in the educational benefits that flow from a racially and ethnically 
diverse student body.  See Gratz, 122 F.Supp.2d 811.  Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected LSA’s argument that the 
policy’s individual review system, which was triggered after the points were assigned, satisfied the Court’s 
requirement that a narrowly tailored policy allow for individual review.  Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2429-31.  Under 
LSA’s policy, admissions officials could flag applicants whom they believed were worthy of personal 
consideration.  Id. at 2432.  Once an application was flagged, the reviewing committee could look at the 
application as a whole, and ignore the points that had been assigned.  Id.
160 Id. at 2430.  The Court held that the possibility of committee review “is of little comfort under our strict 
scrutiny analysis.”  Id. at 2429.  There was not enough information in the record to know how many applicants 
were actually “flagged,” but the Court felt that it was undisputed that the individual consideration was “the 
exception and not the rule.”  Id. It also did not satisfy strict scrutiny because the individualized review of the 
committee only occurred after the LSA distributed “the University’s version of a ‘plus’ that makes race a 
decisive factor for virtually every minimally qualified underrepresented minority applicant.”  Id. at 2430. 
161 Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2430.  
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 2432-33.  The LSA’s automatic award of points did not satisfy the requirements of providing the 
individualized consideration.  Id. This is in contrast to the Law School’s program, which O’Connor held 
constitutional because each application was read completely and considered individually, and therefore race was 
only used as a “plus.”  Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2342-43. 
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points through the other factors in the applicant’s SCUGA score,164 but noted that the points 
assigned for those other categories were significantly lower than those assigned for race.  
Consequently, “[e]ven the most outstanding national high school leader could never receive 
more than five points for his or her accomplishments – a mere quarter of the points 
automatically assigned to an underrepresented minority solely based on the fact of his or her 
race.”165 For these reasons, “the current non-individualized mechanical system,” Justice 
O’Connor wrote, “is flawed and fails under the narrowly tailored test.”166 
Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion, found LSA’s policy flawed because “it 
awards all underrepresented minorities the same racial preference.”167 The policy failed to 
permit admissions counselors the ability to identify and consider non-racial distinctions 
among underrepresented minority applicants.168 Ultimately, Justice Thomas would have 
gone further than his brethren and, potentially, even overruled Bakke.169 According to 
Justice Thomas, “a State’s use of racial discrimination in higher education admissions is 
categorically prohibited under the Equal Protection Clause.”170 
Justice Souter filed a dissenting opinion, and would have likely upheld LSA’s 
policy.171 Noting the holdings in Bakke and Grutter, Justice Souter wrote,  
the Court has acknowledged that there is a [compelling governmental interest 
in achieving] diversity and that race can be considered a plus in the 
164 See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
165 Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2432. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. 
169 See id. 
170 Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2433. 
171 Id. at 2438-39.  Justice Ginsburg joined Part II of the dissent.  Id. Justice Souter agreed with Justice Stevens 
that the Plaintiffs in the case did not have standing.  Id. However, unlike Justice Stevens, Justice Souter 
continued his dissent and held that despite the fact that the Plaintiffs did not have standing, if he looked at the 
merits of the case, he would still dissent from the Court’s opinion.  Id. Justice Souter held that if the LSA’s 
admissions program had been challenged by a Plaintiff with proper Article III standing, he would have 
affirmed the District Court’s summary judgment for the LSA.  Id. at 2442.  However, since he held that the 
Plaintiffs did not have standing, he would vacate the judgment for lack of proper jurisdiction and dissented 
from the Majority opinion.  Id.
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admissions process in order to achieve that diversity.  Awarding value 
requires a school to consider race in a way that increases the applicant’s 
chances of acceptance.172 
Justice Souter chose not to address the issue of whether LSA’s policy was narrowly tailored, 
and criticized the rest of the Court for passing on that issue.  According to Justice Souter, 
the issue before the Court was essentially moot because the Plaintiff who brought the suit 
was a transfer student, and not subject to LSA’s entering class admissions policy.173 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent focused more on the need to correct past inequality than it 
did on the need for diversity in the classroom.174 She wrote, “[t]he stain of generations of 
racial oppression is still visible in our society.”175 As a result, she argued, there is a 
compelling need for such policies, and wide latitude should be given when interpreting 
whether the policies are narrowly tailored.176 Therefore, Justice Ginsburg found “no 
constitutional [infirmities].”177 The policy does not “constrict admissions opportunities”178 
for those who are not members of an under-represented class, and every applicant admitted 
under LSA’s plan was qualified to attend the University of Michigan.  Ultimately, Justice 
Ginsburg acknowledged, schools will continue to use measures to ensure a diverse entering 
class but, in her opinion, the Gratz decision will force these schools to cloak their means of 
172 Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2431-32.  Justice Souter felt that “college admission is not left entirely to inarticulate 
intuition,” and therefore it is proper to assign “some stated value to a relevant characteristic, whether it be 
reasoning ability, writing style, running speed, or minority race.  Id. Justice Powell’s plus factors necessarily are 
assigned some values.  The college simply does by a numbered scale what the law school accomplishes by its 
‘holistic review.’”  Id. at 2441 (quoting Grutter, 123 S. Ct., at 2343). 
173 Id. at 2442.  “The further question whether the freshman admissions plan is narrowly tailored to achieving 
student body diversity remains legally irrelevant to Hamacher and should await a Plaintiff who is actually hurt 
by it.”  Id. at 2439.   
174 Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2443.  In Footnotes 1-9 of her dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg provided extensive 
studies and statistical evidence about the effects of discrimination.  Id. at 2443-44. 
175 Id.at 2446. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 2445. 
178 Id. 
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encouraging diversity in seemingly neutral clothes.179 For these reason, Justice Ginsburg 
concluded that the Majority opinion is not a sound one. 
Although the Grat’z Court opinions did not specifically reference it, the Majority 
opinion, the concurrences, and the dissents resonated with aspects of the Paradise test.  The 
Majority tacitly employed the first prong of the Paradise test by finding that there might be 
alternative methods to achieve diversity at the School, and therefore, alternative means to 
achieve the stated goals might be available.  The Court’s concern with the program’s 
mechanical method of assigning numbers invokes the flexibility prong.  Under the Paradise 
test, a program fails the second prong if it cannot easily ebb and flow with the changing 
demographics.  Both Justice O’Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized LSA’s policy 
for its strict concrete assignment of numbers, and its failure to re-evaluate the numerical 
system throughout the duration of the program.  Justice Thomas also criticized LSA’s policy 
as being inflexible.  
Justice Ginsburg, in her dissent, made clear reference to the first prong of the 
Paradise narrowly tailored test.  Her concern that present effects of past discrimination 
remain in the classroom supported her position that the necessity for relief and the efficacy 
of other alternatives supported the clear mandate for LSA’s admissions program.  Thus, 
while the Court did not specifically rely on the Paradise test in its analysis, its principles 
seemed to serve as the foundation for many of the Justice’s conclusions. 
The Court continued its evaluation of affirmative action admissions policies on the 
same day it decided Gratz, when it considered Grutter v. Bollinger. Again, the court subjected 
179 See Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2446. Justice Ginsburg felt that if schools could not specifically look at race and still 
have their admissions program be constitutional, they would look for alternate ways to include race in 
admissions decisions.  Id.  For example, schools could ask applicants to write about “cultural traditions” in their 
essays or ask if English is their second language.  Id.  Applicants could also attempt to take advantage of their 
race by highlighting associations in minority group organizations or Hispanic family surnames.  Id.  Teachers 
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the policy to strict scrutiny, and again it relied on the principles of the Paradise test, without 
making clear reference to it.  In Grutter v. Bolinger, a divided Court upheld the Law School’s 
admissions policy.180 The Court first reaffirmed past decisions, which found a compelling 
governmental interest in admitting a diverse entering class.181 Furthermore, the Court found 
that the Law School’s policy was narrowly tailored to meet that interest, since it allowed 
members of the admissions committee to individually review individual applicants in a way 
that considered race and ethnicity among a host of diversity factors.182 
The Majority reaffirmed Justice Powell’s conclusion in Bakke, that achieving diversity 
in education supports a finding of a compelling governmental interest.183 Justice O’Connor, 
writing for the Majority, observed that, in the Court’s view, “attaining a diverse student body 
is at the heart of the Law School’s proper institutional mission, and that ‘good faith’ on the 
part of a university is ‘presumed’ absent [in] a showing to the contrary.”184 The Law School 
properly articulated a compelling governmental interest, by stating in its mission statement 
the need to admit a “critical mass” in order to assemble a class that is broadly diverse.185 The 
Court also found that the compelling governmental interests in a diverse classroom 
transcended the classroom to apply to society as a whole.186 They found that the “skills 
could also try to mention an applicant’s race in their letters of recommendations.  Id. 
180 Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2325-31.  Justice O’Connor wrote the Majority opinion, which was 
joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.  Id. at 2330.  Justices Scalia and Thomas joined in 
part.  Id.   
181 Id. at 2329-30. 
182 Id. at 2342.
183 Id. 
184 Id. at 2339 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313).  Justice O’Connor held that the benefits from diversity “are 
substantial,” as shown by the District Court.  Id. Achieving diversity helps promote “cross-racial 
understanding,” breaks down stereotypes, and lets students better understand people from other races.  Id. at 
2339-40. These benefits of diversity were also asserted by the amici, including major American businesses, and 
high-ranking retired officers and civilian officials from the United States Military.  Id. at 2340. 
185 Id. at 2339. 
186 Id. at 2340. 
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needed in today’s increasingly global marketplace can only be developed through exposure 
to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas and viewpoints.”187 
Once the Majority was satisfied that the Law School’s interest in promoting diversity 
sufficiently demonstrated a compelling state interest, it turned its attention to whether the 
policy was narrowly tailored to meet that interest.  Again, the Court did not specifically rely 
on all four prongs of the Paradise test.  Rather, the Majority acknowledged the need for a 
modified version of the Paradise test, holding that the “inquiry must be calibrated to fit the 
distinct issues raised by the use of race to achieve student body diversity in public higher 
education.”188 Consequently, the Court found that in order to past the narrowly tailored test, 
the party defending an affirmative action admissions program need only demonstrate that 
the program was flexible and non-mechanical, and limited in its duration.   
The Court first considered the flexibility of the program.  Specifically, the court 
looked at whether the Law School program employed a quota system or some other means 
that insulated each category of applicants from all other applicants.189 The ideal policy, 
according to the Majority, would be “flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of 
diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each applicant and place them on the same 
footing for consideration, although not necessarily according them the same weight.”190 The 
Law School’s policy made race or ethnicity a factor that could contribute to making an 
applicant qualified for admission to the law school, but neither race nor ethnicity were 
elevated to such significant status that it would have the effect of ensuring automatic 
187 Id. The Court also adopted the Military’s conclusion that “a highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps . . . 
is essential to the military’s ability to fulfill its principle mission to provide national security.” Id. (from amicus 
curie). 
188 Id. at 2341 
189 Id.at 2342 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)).   
190 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2343 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317. 
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acceptance.191 The Law School’s decision to consider race or ethnicity as one of several 
factors of import supported one reason why the Court found that the program was narrowly 
tailored.  
The Court next turned its attention to whether the Law School policy’s mission of 
seeking a “critical mass” would mean that the policy was too broad in scope to be narrowly 
tailored.  The Court’s dissenters argued that the goal of seeking a “critical mass” was really 
nothing more than a disguised quota.192 The Majority disagreed.193 Any policy that gives 
some sort of preferential treatment to a particular category of persons would, indeed, be less 
than ideal, and one could always speculate that there are more restrictive alternatives to 
achieving the goal of a diverse classroom. 194 However, the Majority felt sufficiently 
comfortable that the Law School had adopted a workable and constitutionally permissible 
program.   
Finally, recalling the language of many of its earlier strict scrutiny cases, the Court 
considered whether the Law School policy was narrowly drawn and sufficiently effective to 
achieve its goals.  The Majority recognized that, while one might be able to hypothesize 
alternatives to the Law School’s policy, the policy before the Court met the strict scrutiny 
test.195 However, Justice O’Connor wrote, narrowly tailored “does not require exhaustion of 
191 Id at 2344-45.  Justice O’Connor found significant similarities between the Law School’s policy and the 
Harvard Plan, to which Justice Powell referred in Bakke as constitutionally permissible.  Id. at 2342-44.  Both 
plans adequately ensure that all factors that may contribute to student body diversity are meaningfully 
considered alongside race in admissions decisions.  Id.  Neither the Harvard Plan, nor the Law School’s 
admissions policy, identified either race or ethnicity as the single characteristic that would ensure diversity.  Id. 
192 Id. at 2363.  Chief Justice Rehnquist, with whom Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas join, dissenting.  
193 “The Law School’s goal of attaining a critical mass of underrepresented minority students does not 
transform its program into a quota.”   Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2343.  “[T]here is of course ‘some 
relationship between numbers and achieving the benefits to be derived from a diverse student body, 
and between numbers and providing a reasonable environment for those students admitted.’  ‘[S]ome 
attention to numbers’ without more, does not transform a flexible admissions system into a rigid 
quota.” Id. (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 323). 
194 Id. at 2346.   
195 Id. at 2344-45.  The Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the school had considered race-neutral 
alternatives.  Id. at 2345.  The District Court had proposed race-neutral alternatives like using a lottery system, 
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every conceivable race-neutral alternative,”196 and thus the policy passed the strict scrutiny 
test.197 
While the Majority found that a policy that considers race or ethnicity as one factor 
among several factors to be narrowly tailored, it expressed its concern that schools continue 
to use such policies ad infinitum.198 “In the context of higher education, the durational 
requirement can be met by sunset provisions in race-conscious admissions policies and 
periodic reviews . . .”199 Justice O’Connor wrote that the Court “expect[s] that 25 years from 
now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest 
approved today.”200 
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer concurred with the Court’s finding that the Law 
School’s policy did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, but they took issue with the 
“sunset provision” of Justice O’Connor’s decision.201 Each Justice expressed concern with 
the language of the court.  Justice Ginsburg expressed concern that the provision was 
optimistic, but not realistic.202 She wrote, “One may hope, but not firmly forecast, that over 
the next generation’s span, progress toward nondiscrimination and genuinely equal 
opportunity will make it safe to sunset affirmative action.”203 
decreasing the school’s reliance on grades and test scores, or automatically admitting a certain percentage from 
each high school.  Id.  The court rejected these alternatives; the lottery system would not work because it 
precluded the individualized review that is required.  Id. Requiring the Law School to lower its standards would 
be to drastically change the school and require it to sacrifice a vital part of its educational mission.  Id.
Automatically admitting a certain top percentage of each high school class would also not work because they 
also precluded individualized review and the court did not understand how it could be applied to graduate level 
schools.  Id. 
196 Id. at 2344.   
197 See id. at 2344-45.   
198 Id.  
199 Id. at 2346. 
200 Id. at 2347.   
201 Id. at 2347-48. 
202 See id. 
203 Id. at 2348.   
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Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy each filed a 
separate opinion in which they concurred in part and dissented in part.  Both Justice Thomas 
and Justice Scalia’s opinions suggest that they would never uphold an admissions policy that 
granted racial preferences.204 Justice Thomas concurred with that part of the Court’s holding 
that he interpreted to require “that racial discrimination in higher education admissions 
would be illegal in 25 years.”205 He disagreed, however, with the Court’s decision to uphold 
the Law School’s compelling interest in maintaining a diverse entering class.206 Thomas 
looked at the Law School’s policy from a pragmatic standpoint.  The Law School’s need to 
use race as a plus in admissions, was derived from its desire to admit an elite entering class.207 
As a general matter, non-minority students significantly outperformed under-represented 
minorities on objective tests, hence the need for the “plus” in the admissions policy.  If, 
however, the Law School chose to admit a majority of the student body with objective test 
scores, it would not need to give under-represented minorities a “plus” in the admissions 
process.208 There was no compelling state interest in having an elite Law School, Justice 
Thomas maintained, and for this reason the policy should have been struck down.   
204 Id. at 2350-51.  They concur in part with Rehnquist, who says, “I agree with the Court that, ‘in the limited 
circumstance when drawing racial distinctions is permissible,’ the government must ensure that its means are 
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.”  Id. at 2365. 
205 Id. at 2350.   
206 Id. at 2351. 
207 Id. at 2353-54.   
208 Id. at 2373.  Justice Thomas mentioned “objective test scores” in his dissent, but either did not take notice 
of or does not believe in racial biases in standardized test scores.  See id.  at 2371. 
About 80 to 85 percent of the places in the entering class are given to applicants in the upper 
range of Law School Admissions Test scores and grades.  An applicant with these credentials 
likely will be admitted without consideration of race or ethnicity.  With respect to the 
remaining 15 to 20 percent of the seats, race is likely outcome determinative for many 
members of minority groups.  That is, where the competition becomes tight and where any 
given applicant’s chance of admission is far smaller if he or she lacks minority status.  At this 
point the numerical concept of critical mass has the real potential to compromise individual 
review.   
Id. at 2371.   
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Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent, provided little guidance toward what he 
thought the Law School could have done to assure that the program was narrowly tailored.209 
His dissent, however, paid careful attention to, in his opinion, the inflexibility of the 
program, particularly the relationship between the number of under-represented minority 
students who applied to the Law School, and the number who were accepted.  According to 
the Chief Justice,  
the correlation between the percentage of the Law School’s pool of 
applicants who are members of the three minority groups, and the 
percentage of the admitted applicants who are members of these same 
groups, is far too precise to be dismissed as merely the result of the school 
paying “some attention to [the] numbers.”210 
The mathematical precision in which Justice Rehnquist believed the Law School had 
engaged was problematic, as it was tantamount to a quota.211 For this reason, Rehnquist 
would have struck down the Law School program.   
The Grutter Majority reached its conclusion based on a somewhat clearly articulated, 
narrowly tailored test, separate and apart from the one adopted by the Paradise Court.  
Although the Court definitively articulated its test, one can cull from the various opinions 
certain requirements that the court will insist upon before declaring an affirmative action 
209 See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. 2325. 
210 Id. at 2368.   
[F]rom 1995 through 2000, the Law School admitted between 1,130 and 1,310 students.  Of 
those, between 13 and 19 were Native American, between 91 and 108 were African-
Americans, and between 47 and 56 were Hispanic.  If the Law School [was] admitting 
between 91 and 108 African-Americans in order to achieve “critical mass,” thereby 
preventing African-American students from feeling “isolated or like spokespersons for their 
race,” one would think that a number of the same order of magnitude would be necessary to 
accomplish the same purpose for Hispanics and Native Americans.  Similarly, even if all of 
the Native American applicants admitted in a given year matriculate, which the record 
demonstrates is not at all the case, how can this possibly constitute a ‘critical mass’ of Native 
Americans in a class of over 350 students?  In order for this pattern of admission to be 
consistent with the Law School’s explanation of “critical mass,” one would have to believe 
that the objectives of “critical mass” offered by respondents are achieved with only half the 
number of Hispanics and one-sixth the number of Native Americans as compared to 
African-Americans. 
Id. at 2666-67.  
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admission policy constitutionally valid.  Justice O’Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist 
demanded proof that the program was both flexible and necessary.  Justice O’Connor’s 
durational requirement confirmed the additional need to find that any such program is 
temporary in nature.  Justice Ginsburg, in her dissent, confirmed the need for a durational 
requirement, but disagreed with the specific time limit upon which the Majority relied in this 
case.  Read together along with Gratz, the various Court opinions tie up nicely to create a 
blueprint for considering future constitutional challenges to affirmative action admission 
policies.  
 
Part III:  Defining the Strict Scrutiny Test for Affirmative Action Admission 
Programs. 
 
The use of race in the admissions process mandates a strict scrutiny test “calibrated 
to fit its own distinct issues.”212 The body of law that articulates the appropriate test was 
largely developed in response to Equal Protection Challenges in the workplace.213 With the 
exception of Bakke, the Court did not consider Equal Protection challenges to programs 
aimed at ensuring a diverse classroom until Grutter and Gratz. In the workplace 
environment, the Court will find a compelling governmental interest in a program that was 
created to remedy present effects of past discrimination.214 The program is narrowly tailored 
if it meets the four prongs of the Paradise test.  But where admitting students into educational 
institutions is concerned, the body of case law, starting with Bakke and developed through 
211 See id. at 2368-69. 
212 Id. at 2365. 
213 See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986); Richmond v. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 
(1989); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
214 See supra Part I B. 
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Grutter and Gratz poses a slightly different evaluation of both the compelling governmental 
interest and the narrowly tailored prongs of the compelling governmental interest test.   
Read together, Bakke, Grutter and Gratz, define a construct for drafting a 
constitutionally permissible race-preference admission policy that would withstand strict 
scrutiny.  Under these most recent cases, the Court will find a compelling governmental 
interest if there is proof of a need for diversity in the classroom; the program will pass the 
narrowly tailored test if there is proof that (1) it is the least intrusive and most efficient 
means to achieve the goals of the program or policy and (2) it is “flexible and non-
mechanical”215 and of the Gratz Court is limited in duration.216 
A. The Classroom Diversity Strict-Scrutiny Test:  A New Test for Evaluating 
Affirmative Action Admission Policies.    
 
1. The Compelling Governmental Interest Test 
Both Grutter and Gratz stand for the proposition that Justice Powell’s plurality 
decision finding diversity in education as a compelling governmental interest, is the “law of 
the land.”217 The decisions rejected the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits findings that, under 
Marks, Justice Powell’s definition of a compelling governmental interest was not binding on 
the courts.218 In each case, eight of the nine Justices found that diversity can serve as a 
215 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2342 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315-16). 
216 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2346.  “Enshrining a permanent justification for racial preferences would offend this 
fundamental equal protection principle.  We see no reason to exempt race-conscious admissions programs 
from the requirement that all governmental use of race must have a logical end point.”  Id.; see also Rhenquist’s 
dissent.  “We have emphasized that we will consider ‘the planned duration of the remedy’ in determining 
whether a race-conscious program is constitutional.  Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 510 (Powell, J. concurring); see also 
United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987) (“In determining whether race-conscious remedies are 
appropriate, we look to several factors, including the . . . duration of the relief.”).”  Id. at 2369.   
217 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803). 
218 See supra note 76 and 107.  Note that both Hopwood and Johnson limited their opinion to the precedential 
weight of Justice Powell’s opinion.  Neither discussed the justification of whether diversity supports a 
compelling governmental interest. 
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compelling state interest justifying race-conscious decisions in education.219 Justice Thomas 
was, arguably, the only exception among the brethren on this point.220 
Even Justice Thomas’ dissents in both Grutter and Gratz, each of which cogently 
articulated the assertion that any affirmative action admission policy must fail under the 
Equal Protection Clause, leave room to interpret an instance where there could be a 
compelling governmental interest in admitting a diverse class.221 Justice Thomas suggested 
in Grutter that there is some merit in achieving a diverse student body, writing that classroom 
aesthetics yield educational benefits.222 It was the manner in which each school achieved the 
benefits, more than the benefits themselves with which he took issue.223 
The need for a different definition of a compelling governmental interest in 
programs or policies that promote diversity in the classroom, versus those that promote 
diversity in the workplace, is predicated on the notion that all individuals benefit from a 
diverse learning environment,224 whereas under a capitalist system, promotion or 
advancement in the workplace is to the benefit of the one being promoted and to the 
exclusion of those left behind.  There is clearly a strong societal value to promoting 
underrepresented minorities in the workplace.  Advancing members of a particular race or 
219 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2338-41; Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2426-27. 
220 Gratz 123 S. Ct. at 2433, Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2350-65. 
221 Although in Gratz, Justice Thomas provides a somewhat cursory concurrence to the Court’s extensive 
opinion, in Grutter, he dedicates significant time to defining a compelling governmental interest in the context 
of education.  In Grutter, he acknowledges that there is a compelling governmental interest to remedy present 
effects of past discrimination.  See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2351.  If he were to agree with Justice Ginsburg’s 
concurrence, maintaining that discrimination based on race remains alive in our land, then he would have to 
support a finding of a compelling governmental interest to permit race-conscious admissions policies. 
222 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2353. 
223 Justice Thomas found that had the school relaxed its credentials, it could have achieved its goals.  But, in the 
interest of creating an elite institution, the school needed to adopt the preferential treatment.  Id.  This 
argument rests on the premise that minority applicants perform less well on the LSAT.  See Leslie Yalof 
Garfield, The Academic Support Student in the Year 2010, 69 UNIV. MO. KAN. CITY L. REV. 491 (2001).  If a school 
is to base its admissions on LSAT and wants only those applicants who achieved the highest scores on the 
standardized test, then, because of the disproportionate performance of non-minorities, the applicant pool is 
highly skewed and not as many minority applicants fall in that range.  If Michigan relaxed its median LSAT 
score, then more minority applicants would fall within the school’s target applicant pool. 
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ethnicity can create positive role models for future generations and pave the way to more 
success in those groups, ultimately rendering the need for affirmative action policies 
unnecessary.  However, the Framers of the Equal Protection Clause did not draft it to serve 
as a guarantor that society create role models or promote the social good by developing a 
truly homogenous workplace.225 “The central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause …is 
the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of race,”226 and thus, it cannot 
be used as a means to merely promote a more homogenous society for society’s sake.  Thus, 
because there is no demonstrable benefit to those who may lose a job that is given to a 
member of an under-represented minority class, the compelling governmental interest test, 
when evaluated for purposes of ensuring fairness in the workplace, is limited to instances 
where the defending party can demonstrate proof of present effects of past discrimination. 
In education, however, as Justice Powell nicely articulated, the benefits of education 
flow both ways.227 Legal education is a prime example of Justice Powell’s edict.  The goal of 
224 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313.  (“the benefits of diversity in education flow both ways.”) 
225 A prime example of this might be President Johnson’s appointment of Justice Thurgood Marshall to the 
Supreme Court in 1967.  His past experiences and viewpoints shaped many important cases and, more 
importantly, his visibility and his sage wisdom made him a valuable role model to younger African-Americans.   
226 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).  See also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 
247 (1995) (“[T]he primary purpose of the Equal Protection Clause was to end discrimination against the 
former slaves).  See Associated General Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. San Francisco, 813 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(striking down racial preference under strict scrutiny while upholding gender preference under intermediate 
scrutiny). 
227 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313.  Many Members of the Court have recognized the compelling governmental 
interest in achieving diversity in the classroom.   
In Metro Broadcasting, the Court considered the validity of F.C.C. policies granting preferential 
treatment based on race.  Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, wrote, “a ‘diverse student 
body’ contributing to a ‘robust exchange of ideas’ is a ‘constitutionally permissible goal.’”  
497 U.S. at 567.  In Wygant, where the Court reversed a decision upholding a bargaining 
agreement that limited the number of minority teachers the Board of Education would layoff 
in order to preserve the ratio of minority to non-minority faculty, four Justices recognized 
the compelling governmental interest in diversifying education.  Justice O’Connor in her 
concurrence wrote that the “state interest in the promotion of racial diversity [in education] 
has been found sufficiently compelling.”  Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286 
(1989).  Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun in their dissent agreed with Justice 
O’Connor that the state has a compelling governmental interest in diversifying education.  
Id.
Garfield, supra note 10 at 913-914. 
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teaching future lawyers is to empower them with the ability to review a particular set of facts 
from many angles.228 When students of color bring their past, varied experiences to the 
classroom, it allows others to hear and consider perspectives they might not have considered 
on their own.  To be sure, there is a societal value to having different cultures work side-by- 
side too.  Diversity promotes tolerance, harmony and greater understanding of those around 
us.  But the Equal Protection Clause is not designed to promote tolerance, it is designed to 
promote fairness.  A future law client will get the best and most fair representation from 
someone who has had the benefit of a premier education.  That education, the Justices seem 
to argue, is derived from a student who is taught in a classroom where ideas and experiences 
are varied and shared.229 For this reason, the need to promote diversity in the classroom is a 
proper justification of a compelling governmental interest. 
 
2.  The Narrowly Tailored Test. 
 
The Grutter and Gratz decisions evidence that the Court has adopted an alternative to 
the Paradise narrowly tailored test for application to race-based programs aimed at promoting 
diversity in the classroom. 230 Like its predecessor Courts, the Justices in Grutter and Gratz put
no burden on the defendants to prove that their programs were the most narrowly tailored, 
since “narrowly tailoring does not require exhaustion of every conceivable race neutral 
228 “Attaining a diverse student body is at the heart of the law School’s proper institutional mission.”  Grutter, 
123 S. Ct. at 2329.  See also Sweat v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950) (“legal learning is ineffective in isolation 
from the individuals and institutions with which the law interacts.) 
229 See generally Grutter, 123 S. Ct 2325; Gratz, 123 S. Ct. 2411. 
230 “[The strict scrutiny] inquiry must be calibrated to fit the distinct issues raised by the use of race to achieve 
student body diversity in public higher education.”  Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2341.  “[W]e adhere to Adarand’s 
teaching that the very purpose of strict scrutiny is to take such ‘relevant differences into account.’  Id. at 2342 
(quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 228).  But see Justice Kennedy’s dissent (suggesting that the Majority “abandoned” 
the strict scrutiny test).  Id. at 2374.   
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alternative.”231 An educational admissions program is narrowly tailored, however if (1) it is 
the least intrusive and most effective means to achieve the goals of the program, (2) it is 
“flexible and non-mechanical”232 and limited in duration.233 
The need for a different narrowly tailored test between race-conscious programs 
aimed at achieving diversity in the classroom and those programs aimed at achieving 
diversity in the workplace, is compelling in light of the varying goals of each.  Judge Marcus, 
in Johnson, acknowledged that the “Paradise factors should be adjusted slightly to take better 
account of the unique issues raised by the use of race to achieve diversity in University 
admissions.”234 Judge Marcus proposed a four-pronged test that mirrored, yet slightly 
modified, the Paradise test.235 Neither the Grutter nor the Gratz Court specifically recalled 
Judge Marcus’ remarks; however, the two opinions reached a similar conclusion recognizing, 
through the manner in which it analyzed each case, the need for a new test.  However, while 
Judge Marcus called for a test that mirrors the Paradise test, an interpretation of the Grutter 
and Gratz decisions, read together with Bakke, yields a new narrowly tailored test, distinct in 
231 Id. at 2344.  See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989) (“a regulation of the time, place, or 
manner of protected speech must be narrowly tailored to serve the government’s legitimate, content-neutral 
interests but that it need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so.”); Wygant v. Jackson 
Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 287 (1986) (“. . . plan need not be limited to the remedying of specific instances of 
identified discrimination for it to be deemed sufficiently ‘narrowly tailored’”). 
232 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2342 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315-16).  
233 Id. at 2346.   
234 Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1252. 
235 Id. at 1253.   
a court evaluating a school admissions program designed to serve a compelling interest in 
obtaining the educational benefits associated with a diverse student body should examine: (1) 
whether the policy uses race in a rigid or mechanical way that does not take sufficient 
account of the different contributions to diversity that individual candidates may offer; (2) 
whether the policy fully and fairly takes account of race-neutral factors which may contribute 
to a diverse student body; (3) whether the policy gives an arbitrary or disproportionate 
benefit to members of the favored racial groups; and (4) whether the school has genuinely 
considered, and rejected as inadequate, race-neutral alternatives for creating student body 
diversity. The foregoing factors essentially correspond to all of the factors adopted in 
Paradise (other than duration) for affirmative action plans generally.   
Id.
49
some ways from the Court’s narrowly tailored test for affirmative action programs aimed at 
eliminating discrimination in the workplace.  
 
(a) The program is the least intrusive and most effective means to achieve the goals of the 
program. 
Each decision evidenced that the Court will require proof that the proposed program 
was the least intrusive and most efficient means of accomplishing the programs goal.236 The 
Grutter Majority acknowledged that “the means chosen must fit “th[e] compelling goal so 
closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was 
illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype.”237 In Gratz, respondents argued that drawing the 
least intrusive program would be unduly burdensome, given the multitude of applications 
received each year.238 The Court’s swift rejection of their argument indicates further support 
for the assertion that it will require the most precise, least intrusive means of achieving 
diversity in the classroom, regardless of any demonstrable needs to the contrary.  
 
(2) The program is “flexible and non-mechanical” and limited in duration. 
According to Justice O’Connor in Grutter,
When using race as a “plus” factor in university admissions, [the] equal 
protection Clause requires that a university’s admissions program remain 
flexible enough to ensure that each applicant is evaluated as an individual and 
not in a way that makes an applicant’s race or ethnicity the defining feature 
of his or her application.239 
236 “[The] government is still ‘constrained in how it may pursue that end: [T]he means chosen to accomplish 
the [government’s] asserted purpose must be specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish that purpose.’” 
Grutter at 2341 (citing Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 908 (1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
237 Id. (citing Richmond v. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 493 (plurality opinion)). 
238 See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text. 
239 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2341. 
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A program passes the flexible prong of the narrowly tailored test, therefore, if it 
“considers all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of [an] 
applicant and . . . place[s] them on the same footing for consideration, although not 
necessarily according them the same weight.”240 This flexible approach enables a school to 
“take into account, in practice as well as in theory, a wide variety of characteristics besides 
race and ethnicity that contribute to a diverse student body.”241 
In essence, a flexible program is one that provides for “individualized non-
mechanical review.”242 When considering whether a program passes the flexible prong of 
the narrowly tailored test, the Court is likely to consider the ability of admission committee 
members to evaluate individuals against all other applicants in a given year, and the thought 
or credit granted for non-objective criteria that may contribute to a diverse learning 
experience, not because of membership in a particular class, but rather because of personal 
experience.  The Court cautions that programs that are mechanical in nature, assigning 
numbers or scores to certain attributes, must necessarily fail the flexibility prong of the 
narrowly tailored test, as they have the potential to result in quotas, which are strictly 
prohibited.243 
Justice Souter, in his dissent in Gratz, defined a quota as a something that  “insulates 
all non-minority candidates from competition from certain seats.”244 The Court has labeled 
as quotas a program that sets aside a certain number of admission spots for students based 
240 Bakke at U.S. 317, 98 S.Ct. 2733. 
241 Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2344. 
242 Id. at 2342.   
243 Id. Opponents of the Law School’s program argued that the goal of achieving a critical mass was 
tantamount to setting a quota.  The Majority of the Court, however, clearly disagreed finding that “‘some 
attention to numbers,’ without more, does not transform a flexible admissions system into a rigid quota.” Id. at 
2343. 
244 Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2440 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317). 
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on membership in particular groups245 and a program that assigns points to applicants based 
exclusively on membership in those groups.246 In each of these programs, the school’s 
policy had the effect of giving applicants who are members of a particular racial or ethnic 
group, a mathematical advantage over other applicants, which often resulted in automatic 
admission, precluding the need for committee review.  Consequently, the use of quotas such 
as the ones challenged in Bakke and Gratz, prohibit admissions committees from meaningful 
consideration of factors other than race, which could contribute to diversity in the 
classroom.  The Court termed any program that resulted in a lack of meaningful comparison 
between individual applicants as inflexible and mechanical, and therefore constitutionally 
prohibited under the Equal Protection Clause.247 
Despite its recognition that admissions policies must necessarily pay “some attention 
to numbers”248 the Court has struck down the use of numerical goals, calling such an 
instrument a quota. In Bakke, Justice Powell wrote that “there is some relationship between 
numbers and achieving the benefits to be derived from a diverse student body, and between 
numbers and providing a reasonable environment for those students to be admitted”249 But 
in each of the affirmative action admission cases, the Courts were swift to reject the need for 
setting particular numbers to achieve diversity.  In Bakke, a majority of the Court held that 
goals and quotas are never permissible in enacting race-conscious programs,250 and ultimately 
struck down the University of California at Davis Medical School admissions program as 
violating of the Equal Protection Clause because it set aside a specific number of seats for 
245 Bakke, 438 U.S. 285. 
246 See supra notes 113-124 and accompanying text.   
247 See supra notes 15-40, 113-124 and accompanying text. 
248 Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2349. 
249 Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2343 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 323). 
250 See supra notes 15-40 and accompanying text. 
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minority applicants.251 The Majority in Gratz, raised concerns because LSA’s policy of 
automatically assigning points to applicants, who are members of a particular racial or ethnic 
groups, had the effect of giving those applicants a mathematical advantage over other 
applicants, thereby, arguably, creating easier access to acceptance into the University.252 
In addition to proving that the program is flexible, under the second prong of the 
Paradise test, the defending party must establish that the challenged program is limited in 
duration.  The Grutter Court placed an affirmative duty on courts to limit constitutionally 
permissible race-conscious programs to those with a limited duration.  Justice O’Connor 
wrote in Grutter “[a] core purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to do away with all 
governmentally imposed discrimination based on race.”253 “Accordingly, race-conscious 
admissions policies must be limited in time.”254 In the context of achieving diversity in the 
classroom, “the durational requirement can be met by sunset provisions in race-conscious 
admissions policies and periodic reviews to determine whether racial preferences are still 
necessary to achieve student body diversity.”255 
251 See supra notes 15-40 and accompanying text. 
252 See supra notes 113-124 and accompanying text.  But see Souter dissent in Gratz (“The record does not 
describe a system with a quota like the one struck down in Bakke, which ‘insulate[d]’ all nonminority candidates 
from competition in certain seats).  Gratz, 123 S. Ct. 2440 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317).   
253 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2346 (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984)). 
254 Id. Justice O’Connor writes, 
This requirement reflects that racial classifications, however compelling their goals, are 
potentially so dangerous that they may be employed no more broadly than the interest 
demands.  Enshrining a permanent justification for racial preferences would offend this 
fundamental equal protection principle.  We see no reason to exempt race-conscious 
admissions programs from the requirement that all governmental use of race must have a 
logical end point.  The Law School, too, concedes that all “race-conscious programs must 
have reasonable durational limits. 
Id.
255 Id. In Grutter, the Majority, arguably, called for the abolishment of affirmative action admission policies 
within the next twenty-five years.  Justice Ginsburg, in her concurrence took exception to the Majority’s 
mandate, writing that Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence in Grutter supports the notion that the language must be 
read as discretionary.  She wrote that “[f]rom today’s vantage point, one may hope, but not firmly forecast, that 
over the next generation’s span, progress toward nondiscrimination and genuinely equal opportunity will make 
it safe to sunset race-conscious.”  Id. at 2348.  See also Thomas (dissenting) (“While I agree that in 25 years the 
practice of the Law School will be illegal, they are, for the reasons I have given, illegal now).  Id. at 2364.   
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The Gratz Court never fully considered the issue of whether LSA’s policy failed the 
durational requirement of the narrowly tailored test.  The Grutter Court, however, supported 
the Law School’s program under the durational requirement, in part because the Law School 
in its Brief to the Court conceded, all “race-conscious programs must have reasonable 
durational limits.”256 In addition, the 1992 admission policy, upon which the lawsuit was 
based, called for a periodic review to assess whether the program was meeting its stated 
goals.  The Law School’s identifiable goal of rendering its own program unnecessary in the 
future was sufficient for the Court to find it met the limited in duration requirement. 
 
B. The Appropriateness of the Classroom Diversity Strict-Scrutiny Test. 
 
At the outset, the new strict-scrutiny test is really just a reaffirmation and further 
interpretation of Bakke, particularly when defining a compelling governmental interest.  The 
Court’s ruling serves to quash the split in the Circuits created by the Smith, Johnson, and 
Hopwood courts.  Grutter and Gratz formalize an identifiable compelling governmental interest 
in achieving diversity in education.  Post-Grutter and Gratz, courts charged with evaluating 
the constitutionality of race-based programs must find a compelling governmental interest in 
those programs if they are designed to remedy present effects of past discrimination in the 
workplace,257 or to achieve diversity in the classroom.258 
The narrowly tailored prong of the classroom diversity strict scrutiny test for 
affirmative action admissions programs is rightfully distinguishable from the Paradise test. 
The classroom diversity test retains only the first and second prongs of the Paradise test; the 
courts must consider (1) the necessity of the relief and the efficacy of alternative remedies, 
256 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2370 (quoting Brief for Respondents Bollinger et al. at 32). 
257 See supra Part I. A. 2. 
258 See supra Part I. B. and II. 
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and (2) the flexibility of the program and the duration of the relief.  The other two prongs of 
the Paradise narrowly tailored test do not, as Justice Marcus suggests in Johnson, allow for a 
fair evaluation of the unique set of circumstances presented when reviewing race-conscious 
programs aimed at achieving diversity in the classroom.259 
The first prong of the Paradise test, wherein the necessity for the relief and the 
efficacy of alternative remedies are considered, really relates to the demonstrable need for 
achieving the stated goals of the program and proof that the proposed program will meet 
those goals, regardless of whether the program is aimed at eradicating discrimination in the 
workplace or those aimed at achieving diversity in education.  Both types of programs are 
designed to reach the same end, which is to meet the stated goals of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, that governmental programs impact on individual citizens equally. The 
commonalities of these two types of programs support the need to retain the first prong of 
the Paradise test.   
 The second prong of the Paradise test, which requires the program to be flexible, 
waivable, and temporary in nature, is also relevant to programs designed to achieve diversity 
in the classroom.  Under this prong, the Court has stated, an affirmative action program 
must be easily adaptable to changing needs (flexible); easily terminated when not needed 
(waivable); and limited in duration (temporary).260 As a general matter, the Court has found 
that a program is “flexible” when it includes the ability to consider race, ethnicity or gender 
as one of several criteria.  For example, in Johnson v. Transportation Agency,261 the Court 
considered a challenge to a county affirmative action program that allowed the County to 
consider an applicant’s gender or race for purpose the of remedying the under-
259 Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1252. 
260 See Paradise, 480 U.S. at 178; Garfield, supra note 10 at 916. 
261 Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal. 480 U.S. 616 (1987) 
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representation of women and minorities in traditionally segregated job categories.  The plan, 
the Court held, “represents a moderate, flexible, case by case approach to effecting a gradual 
improvement in the representation of minorities and women in the Agency’s work 
force…”262 Courts have found that those programs that are easily terminated or provided for 
periodic review met the durational requirement, while those programs that did not include a 
provision for termination were invalid.  In Croson, the Court struck down the Minority 
Business Enterprise legislation since it did not have either a specific termination date or, at a 
minimum, a provision for reviewing the legislation.263 The Paradise court, in contrast, found 
the one-black-to-one-white hiring plan sufficiently limited in duration since the District 
Court mandated the hiring program only for as long as the department continued to prohibit 
minorities from being promoted.264 Additionally, under the consent decree, the court could 
easily eliminate the program once Alabama’s Department of Public Safety promoted a 
reasonable number of Black and Hispanic troopers by no longer mandating the state’s 
method of promotion.  Finally in Grutter, the Court held that the Law School Program was 
sufficiently temporary in nature, the Program provided for periodic faculty review, and it was 
easy to terminate once the School found that it no longer needed to consider race as a factor 
to achieve diversity.265 
The need for an assessment of the flexibility and duration of a program transcends 
the fundamental goals that a race-conscious program seeks to achieve.  Regardless of 
whether the programs exist to eradicate present effects of past discrimination in the 
workplace, or achieve diversity in the classroom, because these programs give some type of 
preference to members of a particular class they are designed in a manner that potentially 
262 Id. at 642. 
263 Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
264 Paradise, 480 U.S. at 178. 
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infringes on another’s rights under the Equal Protection Clause.  The higher purpose of 
these programs and policies is to achieve a status-quo that no longer requires any 
infringement.  For this reason, it is necessary that the Court always consider the ability to 
limit and change both workplace-oriented and education-oriented race-conscious programs 
as they become less necessary. 
 The third and fourth prongs of the Paradise test are less necessary for evaluating the 
permissibility of affirmative action admission policies under the equal protection clause.  The 
third prong of the test – the relationship of numerical goals to the relevant population – 
applies where the entity offering the program has set a numerical goal for achieving diversity.  
For example, in Croson, the Court considered legislation that required primary contractors 
awarded city construction contracts to subcontract at least thirty percent of the dollar 
amount of each contract to Minority Business Enterprises.266 The Richmond Legislature 
chose the numerical goal of 30% based on the percentage of minorities in the general 
population.267 The Court found that since the City’s goal of 30% minority sub-contractors 
reflected the general population and not the relevant population of minority contractors in 
the area, it did not meet the third element of the narrowly tailored test.268 The Paradise court 
held that the one-black-to-one-white hiring scheme was valid because the goal of the 
program was measured against the non-white population in the relevant work force.269 
In education, the use of numerical goals is impermissible since setting goals for the 
number of seats a school might want to fill with minority candidates is tantamount to setting 
a quota.  Both the Grutter and Gratz courts make clear that the only purpose for evaluating 
265 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2346. 
266 Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. at 507. 
267 Id. 
268 Id. 
269 Paradise, 480 U.S at 177-78. 
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numbers is to ensure that the programs do not result in a de facto quota system.270 To be sure, 
as Justice O’Connor recognized in Grutter, any program aimed at increasing diversity is 
necessarily going to require a numbers assessment.271 Such numbers assessments, however, 
must be for the sole purpose of ensuring that the program does not include numerical goals. 
As the Majority in Bakke found, goals and quotas are never permissible in enacting race-
conscious programs.272 
The fourth prong – that the policy may not favor one group over another – is 
arguably, an inappropriate consideration for affirmative action admission policies mostly 
because Bakke established, and Grutter and Gratz reaffirmed, that the benefits of diversity in 
education favor all parties in an equal manner.273 To be sure, the Court has upheld programs 
aimed at ending past discrimination in the workplace where the program creates a slight 
burden on one party in comparison to another.  For example, the Paradise court held that the 
one-black-to-one-white hiring requirement did not pose an unacceptable burden on white 
males because the program did not absolutely bar any non-minority individual’s 
advancement; it merely postponed the white males’ advancement.274 However, in Paradise,
the Court also found that the advancement of black candidates was to the detriment to 
Caucasian police academy applicants.275 In contrast, the Court has concluded that there is an 
equal benefit to any participant in the classroom, regardless of race or ethnicity.  Under this 
reasoning, arguably, all individuals are “favored” by constitutionally permissible affirmative 
270 See supra Part II.  Justice Thomas, in his dissent in Grutter, wrote that the “concept of critical mass is a 
delusion used by the Law School to mask its attempt to make race an automatic factor in most instances and to 
achieve numerical goals indistinguishable from quotas.”  Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2371.   
271 See supra notes 179-210 and accompanying text. 
272 See supra notes 15-40 and accompanying text. 
273 See supra Part I. A. 1 and Part II and accompanying notes. 
274 Paradise, 480 U.S. at 182-83.  The Court noted that, under the program, fifty percent of those promoted 
were non-minority, there were no layoffs, and the basic requirement that black troopers must be qualified still 
remained.  Id. at 182-83.  The Court concluded that these provisions safeguarded the program against providing 
unequal treatment for individuals.  Id. at 183. 
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action admission policies.  Therefore, consideration of whether a program favors one group 
over another is unnecessary when evaluating the constitutionality of programs and policies 
aimed at achieving diversity in the classroom. Thus, the fourth prong of the Paradise test is 
not applicable. 
Conclusion  
The “relevant differences”276 between achieving diversity in the workplace and 
achieving diversity in the classroom demand different strict scrutiny tests.  The Court’s 
decision to hear the Grutter and Gratz cases following a 25-year silence on the issue of the 
constitutionality of affirmative action admission policies provided the necessary forum for 
articulating a new test.  The classroom diversity strict scrutiny test retains the broad 
requirements of its predecessor test, which was largely based on evaluating affirmative action 
programs and policies aimed at achieving equality in the workplace.  Any race-conscious 
program or policy must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest 
in order to withstand a Constitutional challenge.  The classroom diversity test varies most 
significantly from the former test in the manner in which it defines the elements of the 
narrowly tailored prong.  An interpretation of the Grutter and Gratz rulings reveals that the 
four-pronged Paradise narrowly tailored test is too expansive for evaluating race-conscious 
admissions policies.  Where education is concerned, a defending party need only 
demonstrate that the program is (1) the least intrusive and most effective means to achieve 
the goals of the program and (2) flexible and limited in duration.277 
The Court, in passing judgment on the University of Michigan’s different admission 
policies, provided guidance into what satisfies each prong of the classroom diversity strict 
275 Id. See supra note _. 
276 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2341-42 (quoting Adarand, 115 U.S at 228). 
277 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2342, 2362. 
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scrutiny test.278 The Court affirmed Justice Powell’s pronouncement in Bakke that diversity 
in the classroom serves a compelling governmental interest.279 Moreover, the Courts found 
admissions policies that allow for individual review meet the flexible prong of the narrowly 
tailored test whereas policies that assign points to membership in a particular class are not 
flexible, whereas programs.280 Finally, a program that is easily terminated is sufficiently 
limited in duration.281 
The new strict scrutiny test is appropriate since it more accurately reflects the goals, 
benefits, and limitations of an affirmative action program aimed at achieving diversity in the 
classroom than did the old test, which was developed in response to challenges in the 
workplace.  At the outset, the test recognizes the wide-reaching educational benefit that 
these policies have to both members of a particular underrepresented class and to members 
of the majority.  The new test also disbands with the requirement that the program or policy 
evaluate numerical goals, recognizing that the use of numerical goals is never appropriate in 
educational admissions decisions. 
The need for a new strict scrutiny test for race-conscious programs aimed at 
achieving diversity in the classroom provides a much-desired window of opportunity for 
proponents of affirmative action admissions policies.  The Court’s de facto articulation of 
this new test, and its findings under the test, provide solid guidelines for schools to develop 
workable programs in the future.  More importantly, the Court’s adoption of the new strict 
scrutiny test, and its decision to uphold an affirmative action admission policy under the test, 
confirm its commitment to continued use of race-conscious programs aimed at achieving 
diversity in the classroom.
278 See supra Part III. B and accompanying footnotes. 
279 See generally Gratz, 123 S. Ct. 2411. 
280 Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2430. 
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281 See Paradise, 480 U.S. at 178; Garfield, supra note 10 at 916. 
